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Case No. 20150011-CA 
INTHE 
UT AH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plain tiff! Appellee, 
v. 
JASON IVfICHAEL SPEED, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from the denial of a motion for relief from 
judgment and for a restitution hearing following a conviction and 
sentencing for attempted theft, a third-degree felony. This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2015). 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant pled guilty to attempted theft by deception and admitted 
that, acting as a supervisor and over the course of seven months, he 
discounted his employer's high-end Blackberry phones to nothing, sent 
them to his personal address, and disposed of them by selling and giving 
them away. At sentencing, the judge ordered that Defendant pay restitution 
amounting to $126,547. When defense counsel stated that he and the 
prosecutor had discussed having a restihttion hearing, the judge invited 
counsel to amass his evidence and submit it with a motion for a hearing and 
she would set a date. The judge refused to defer monthly payments in the 
meantime, wanting Defendant to begin reimbursing the victim 
immediately. Defendant made no restitution payments for eighteen months 
and waited nearly four years before filing a motion for a hearing. 
Sixteen months after sentencing, the judge apparently discovered that 
the restitution amount imposed at the sentencing hearing had been omitted 
from the written judgment. Accordingly, she corrected the clerical error, 
entering a new judgment nunc pro tune with the correct restihttion figure. 
Thereafter, the case was assigned to a new judge. 
Three years after sentencing, when Adult Probation and Parole later 
sought to terminate probation and to h·ansfer all outstanding payments to 
the State Department of Debt Collection, the new judge notified the parties 
and asked for input. Getting no feedback, she terminated probation and 
transferred the outstanding payments as requested. A year later, Defendant 
filed a 1notion for relief from the restitution order and, alternatively, for a 
restitution hearing. The district court denied both requests. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court properly deny Defendant's motion for relief 
from the restitution order and request for a restitution hearing made four 
years after the sentencing hearing? 
Standard of Review. The denial of a motion for relief from judgment is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion because such motions are inherentiy fact 
intensive and involve principles of fairness and equity not easily reviewable 
at the appellate level. Honie v. State, 2014 UT 19, if29, 342 P.3d 182. Legal 
determinations made part of the ruling are reviewed for correctness. Id. 
This Court '"will not disturb"' an order of restitution "'unless the trial 
court exceeds the authority prescribed by law or abuses its discretion."' 
State v. Poulsen, 2012 UT App 292, ,rs, 288 P.3d 601 (quoting State v. Miller, 
2007 UT App 332, 16, 170 P.3d 1141) (additional citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
2. Has Defendant overcome the strong presumption that his counsel 
performed effectively in not seeking a restitution hearing date where a 
legitimate strategy exists for not doing so, and Defendant shows no 
reasonable likelihood of a different result had he obtained a hearing? 
Standard of Review. Ineffective assistance claims raised for the first 
time on appeal are reviewed for correctness. State v. Bryant, 2012 UT A pp 
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264, ,I10, 290 P.3d 33. Nevertheless, "O]udicial scrutiny of counsel's 
performance must be highly deferential." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 689 (1984). The Court "indulge[s] a strong presumption that counsel's 
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." 
Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38a-102, -203, -302 (West Supp. 2005) 
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38a-301 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of facts. 
Defendant's responsibilities as a supervisor in the Salt Lake City call 
center of ACS, Inc. [" ACS"] included overseeing employees taking calls 
from Verizon Wireless customers and taking calls hhnself. 1 R25, 37; R121:5. 
Supervisors were authorized to discount phones to customers if, for 
example, customers complained or sought to cancel service. R37. 
1 ACS is an information technology outsource service cmnpany whose 
Salt Lake City office worked with Verizon Wireless. R4, 37. 
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Defendant was one of four ACS employees who, without 
authorization, discounted high-end Blackberry phones to nothing, and then 
sent the phones to their personal addresses. R25, 37; R121:5-6. Defendant 
was "the big one" of the four, discounting and selling or giving away 
significantly more phones than any of the others during a seven-month 
period in 2009. R38-40; R121:5; R122:7. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
The guilhJ plea 
The State charged Defendant with second-degree felony theft by 
deception in violation of Utah Code Ann.§ 76-6-405 (West Supp. 2004). R3-
5. Defendant pled guilty to third-degree felony atte1npted theft by 
deception, and the prosecutor agreed to recommend probation. R24-32. At 
the State's request, Judge Judith Atherton ordered a presentence 
investigation report ["PSI"]. R32. It included a sentencing recommendation 
of 36 months' probation and payment of $126,547 in restitution. R36. The 
restitution figure was calculated by ACS' s Incident Response Crisis 
Management Department. R32, 36, 40. The PSI revealed that two of the co-
defendants had already received the saine plea bargain and been sentenced 
-5-
to 36 months' probation and payment of restitution specific to each 
defendant. 2 R39. 
Sentencing 
At the sentencing hearing on October 15, 2010, defense counsel 
sought probation. He said that Defendant took full responsibility for his 
actions and had recently obtained two jobs "in anticipation of having a large 
financial obligation related to this case." R122:4 (transcript in Addendum 
B). The judge voiced concern, however, when she discovered that in the 
year and a half since the offense, Defendant had not saved anything with 
which to help repay the "huge" debt he owed to ACS. R122:5-6. The judge 
and defense counsel discussed the seriousness of Defendant's actions., the 
repetitive nature of the offense, the large number of expensive phones 
involved, and the adverse impact this felony conviction would have on his 
future job prospects. R122:5-8. Counsel also touched on restitution, noting 
that the amount in the PSI was based on "the full retail value" of the phones 
and that the defense was "a little bit in question as to whether or not" the 
full amount of restitution reflected in the PSI was attributable to Defendant. 
R122:5, 7. 
2The third defendant entered the sa1ne plea but had yet to be 
sentenced. R39. 
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Judge Atherton imposed on Defendant the same sentence she had 
given the previous two co-defendants: a suspended sentence of zero-to-five 
years at the state prison with credit for time already served, 36 months' 
probation, fines and fees, and restitution. R39, 43-44; R122:8-10. Although 
restitution in each of the other two matters was less than $6,000, the judge 
announced restitution in this case to be $126,547 - the amount included in 
the PSI. R39-40; R43-44; R122:9. The judge noted that Defendant stole and 
sold significantly more of the high-end Blackberry phones than the other 
three co-defendants. R121:5; R122:5-6. She stressed that she wanted to 
impose restitution immediately "rather than deferring it," that she expected 
Defendant "to make monthly payments every single 1nonth toward the 
restitution," that she wanted ACS "to immediately start getting reimbursed 
for their losses," and that she expected Defendant "to make significant 
advances towards dealing with this enormous restitution" amount so as to 
✓/make your victim whole." R122:9-10. 
Defense counsel then informed the judge th.at he and the prosecutor 
had discussed the possibility of a restitution hearing. R122:10. That 
prompted the following exchange: 
THE COURT: Well, get closer. If there are disputes I - I set a 
lot of these restitution hearings because it's murky. So what I 
want you to do is file a motion for restitution. 
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[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. 
THE COURT: And with some specifics about what I can look 
at before we get to the restitution hearing-
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right. 
THE COURT: -- and nobody knows anything. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yeah. I don't think it's going to be a 
complicated hearing. The only issue is really addressing his 
availability to pay and those resources he has available to pay 
this whole amount. 
R122:10-1 l. 
Four days later, a written judgment was entered that included all the 
sentencing terms, including "Pay Restitution," but did not specify a specific 
restitution amount. R46-47 (in Addendu1n C).3 
Correction of written judgment 
Adult Probation and Parole [" AP&P"] filed progress reports four 
months and nine months after sentencing, each of which listed Defendant's 
probation conditions, including that he pay restitution. R48, 50-51. But the 
reports did not specify the restitution amount. Id. In addition to revealing 
Defendant's positive progress on probation and his pay1nent of his fines 
and fees, both reports sought to terminate probation. R48-52. The judge 
3The docket, however, includes the content of the written judgment 
and reflects the $126,547 restitution amount. Docket at 8-9. 
-8-
~I 
dismissed the fine but did not terminate or transfer probation.4 Id.; Docket 
at 10 (in Addendum D). 
In February 2012, Judge Atherton apparently recognized that the 
original judgment erroneously failed to include the restitution amount she 
had imposed at sentencing. Accordingly, she entered a corrected judgment 
nunc pro tune which mirrors the original judgment but includes the $126,547 
restitution amount from the sentencing hearing. R53-55 (in Addendum C); 
Docket at 10 ("Sentence, Judgment, Commitment minutes modified" and 
"Judgment #2 Entered$ 126547.00") (capitalization omitted).5 
Request for restitution hearing 
In August 2013, Judge Vernice Trease was assigned this case, and 
AP&P filed a third progress report which included the restitution amount of 
$126,547. R57-58; Docket at 11. The report also showed that Defendant had 
so far paid $1,418 in restitution, that he "paid his debts religiously," and 
that he "understands he will be paying on" the large restitution amount "for 
several years, if not forever." R58. The probation officer recommended that 
4The modified judgment appeared in the record seven months after 
the second report. R53-55. 
5 A copy of the modified judgment was also entered in the record next 
to the original judgment. R43-45 (in Addendu1n C); Docket at 10 (reflecting 
"Sentence, Judgment, Commitment minutes modified" on 10/18/10 and 
2/27 /12) (capitalization omitted). 
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the case be closed as successful and that the remaining restitution be 
referred to the Office of State Debt Collection. R58-59. 
Before ruling on the recommendation, Judge Trease notified the 
parties and gave them 14 days to object. R56-57. Receiving nothing, the 
judge terminated probation on October 16, 2013, and referred the remaining 
restitution as requested by AP&P. R59. The judge noted, however, that 
"because restitution is still outstanding, termination cannot be successful for 
UCA 76-3-402 purposes." Id. 
Two weeks later, the judge received a letter from Defendant asking 
for a restitution hearing. R60. He explained that he did not get one, did not 
know he was entitled to one, and was not told of that fact by his trial 
counsel. Id. He claimed that he did not know he owed restitution until 18 
months after sentencing, at which time over $7,000 in interest had already 
accrued. Id. 
The judge notified the parties of the letter, and new defense counsel 
filed a 1notion six months later seeking relief fro1n the restitution order or, in 
the alternative, a restitution hearing. R73-90; Docket at 12. More than four 
years after the original sentencing hearing, Judge Trease held a hearing on 
the 1notion. R123. She reviewed the entire case, heard argument, and then 
found that Judge Atherton had imposed restitution at sentencing in the 
-10-
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amount stated in the PSI.6 R123:3-10 (transcript in Addendum E). She also 
found that although Judge Atherton had ordered restitution to begin 
immediately, the restitution amount had been omitted from the written 
judgment, prompting Judge Atherton to later correct the judgment to 
accurately reflect her restitution order. R123:10. She further found that 
although Judge Atherton had left the option of a restitution hearing open 
for Defendant, no one ever asked her to schedule one. R123:10-12. Judge 
Trease noted that the case had proceeded based on the restitution imposed 
at sentencing and that probation was ultimately terminated while "nobody 
bother[ed] to do anything." R123:11. Finally, Judge Trease found that she 
had received no objections from anyone in response to the notice she sent 
about the pending probation termination. R123:10-11. Accordingly, the 
judge held, Defendant was not entitled to relief from the restitution order, 
and he had waived his right to a restitution hearing. R123:12, 14-15. 
6 Although the transcript for the motion hearing is labeled 
"Restitution Hearing," it is actually a hearing on Defendant's 1notion. R123. 
The transcription of an exchange between defense counsel and the court at 
that hearing contains two errors. First, on page 5 when defense counsel 
quotes from the sentencing transcript, she cites to page 8, line 6 of the 
sentencing transcript; the quote is actually located at page 10, line 11. 
R123:5 (referring to R122:10). Second, on the same page, after the court says, 
"Okay" on line 7, the transcript shows that the rest of the page is 
commentary frmn the court; it is actually the continuation of defense 
counsel's argument. R123:5. 
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Defendant timely appealed and obtained new counsel. R99-101, 107. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: Defendant argues that Judge Trease erred in denying his 
motion for relief from judgment and request for restitution hearing. He 
preserved only one of his arguments for appellate review, however, and his 
failure to argue an exception to the preservation rule for the remaining 
arguments prevents merits review of those arguments on appeal. 
In any event, Judge Trease properly denied the motion that was filed 
four years after Judge Atherton imposed restitution at sentencing and six 
months after Judge Trease closed the case. Judge Atherton imposed 
complete restitution at sentencing, and its omission from the written 
judgment was a clerical error she later corrected nunc pro tune. She did not 
intend to impose court-ordered restitution and was not required to do so. 
Hence, restitution was timely imposed. 
Defendant's claim that the State proved no causal link between his 
crhninal conduct and ACS's loss is rebutted by the record, which shows that 
Defendant's admitted conduct was the sole cause of ACS' s loss. Hence, the 
loss would not have occurred but for Defendant's criminal conduct. 
Additionally, the losses were both factually and temporally tied to that 
conduct. Finally, Judge Atherton did not shift to Defendant the State's 
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burden of proving restitution when she required that Defendant support his 
challenge to the restitution order. 
Defendant also argues that he was entitled to relief from the 
restitution order because Judge Atherton denied him a full restitution 
hearing when she did not immediately schedule a hearing after he objected 
to restitution at sentencing. The delay, he claims, was inherently unfair and 
contrary to the Restitution Act. His claim, however, is unpreserved, and he 
argues no exception to the preservation rule. Should this Court review it, 
the claim is entitled to no more than plain error review. 
Defendant fails to show obvious prejudicial error because Judge 
Atherton fully c01nplied with her statutory duty by agreeing to schedule a 
hearing as soon as Defendant informed her that he was ready to proceed. 
Further, Defendant offers no authority for his claim that the judge's actions 
violated her responsibilities under the Act. Finally, his claim that he is 
legally insulated from his trial counsel's failure to further pursue a hearing 
is inadequately briefed and does not warrant review. 
Point II: Defendant argues that his h·ial counsel was ineffective for 
not filing a motion to set a restitution hearing. The claim fails because the 
record is inadequate to allow him to meet his heavy burden to overcome 
Strickland's sh·ong presumption that counsel performed effectively. 
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Defendant's claim is speculative in the absence of record evidence that trial 
counsel would have presented favorable evidence that would have reduced 
the restitution amount. Accordingly, Strickland requires the presumption 
that trial counsel reasonably decided not to request the hearing due to a lack 
of beneficial evidence. 
The record is also inadequate to show prejudice where it lacks any 
facts to show that the restitution amount was reasonably likely to have 
changed had a hearing occurred. Defendant's assumption that the amount 
would have changed does not demonstrate prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
JUDGE TREASE PROPERLY DENIED THE MOTION FOR 
RELIEF FROM THE RESTITUTION ORDER AND THE 
ALTERNATIVE REQUEST FOR A RESTITUTION 
HEARING FILED FOUR YEARS AFTER RESTITUTION 
WAS IMPOSED AND SIX MONTHS AFTER THE CASE 
WAS CLOSED 
Defendant contends that he was entitled to relief from the sentencing 
court's restitution order or, alternatively, to a restitution hearing to dispute 
the amount of restitution owing. Specifically, he argues that, despite his 
objecting to restitution at sentencing, Judge Atherton did not enter a 




set a restitution hearing, and did not make the State prove that his criminal 
conduct caused the victim's damages. Aplt.Br. 9-22. 
Defendant raised only one of these arguments below: that no 
restitution order was entered within a year of sentencing. Because he does 
not acknowledge that the remaining issues are unpreserved or argue any 
exception to the preservation rule, this Court should not reach those claims. 
Alternatively, all of Defendant's claims fail on their merits. First, the 
sentencing judge ordered restitution within a year of sentencing where she 
unequivocally ordered complete restitution at the sentencing hearing, and 
the omission of the restitution amount from the written judgment was a 
clerical error she later corrected nun.c pro tune. Second, Defendant forfeited 
the right to a restitution hearing to dispute the amount when he waited 
nearly four years to request one and did so after the case was closed. 
Finally, the causal link between Defendant's criminal conduct and the 
victim's loss was clear and the losses were both factually and temporally 
tied to Defendant's conduct. 
A. This Court should decline to reach the merits of all but 
one of Defendant's claims because he did not preserve 
them, and he argues no exception to the preservation rule. 
The only argument presented to Judge Trease below was that the 
restitution order was void because it was not entered within one year of the 
-15-
sentence. R88-89; R123:5-7; see Point IB, infra. Defendant did not present any 
of his other arguments to Judge Trease, and he argues neither plain error 
nor exceptional circumstances to support their consideration on appeal. He 
simply presents each argument as if preserved. Aplt.Br. 9-14, 17-25. 
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be 
raised on appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ~ 11, 10 P.3d 346 (citation 
omitted). "[T]he preservation rule applies to every claim, ... unless a 
defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain 
error' occurred." Id. (citation omitted). 
Defendant ignores the preservation rule. According! y, this Court 
should refuse to reach the merits of his unpreserved claims. See State v. 
Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ~21, 167 P.3d 1046 (refusing to address merits of 
unpreserved claim where Defendant "declined to present an argument to 
support the application of either exception" to preservation rule); State v. 
Veale, 2012 UT App 131, ,12, 278 P.3d 153 (refusing to address unpreserved 
appellate argument for which Veale argued neither plain error nor 
exceptional circumstances on appeal). 
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B. Restitution was imposed at sentencing and, therefore, well 
within the statutory one-year period. 
1. Clerical error in written judgment. 
In his only preserved argument, Defendant contends that this Court 
should vacate the restitution order because it was not entered within one 
year of sentencing. Aplt.Br. 15. According to Defendant, Judge Atherton 
merely "discussed" the amount of complete restitution at sentencing 
without including a final amount in her written order. Id. at 17. Defendant 
argues that omitting the amount from the final order was "more" than a 
mere clerical error, and that the judge's subsequent correction of the written 
judgment to include the amount she had "discussed" fell outside the one 
year period required by statute. Id. Consequently, Defendant claims that 
Judge Atherton lacked jurisdiction to enter a written order setting 
restitution when she corrected the judgment in 2012, and that Judge Trease 
abused her discretion in denying him relief from that judgment. Id. 
Alternatively, Defendant argues that even if complete restitution was 
imposed, Judge Atherton intended to impose court-ordered restitution as 
well, and when she failed to do so within one year of the sentence, he was 
entitled him to relief from the whole restitution order. Id. at 17-19. 
As explained below, Judge Trease properly ruled that Judge Atherton 
imposed a set amount of restitution at sentencing, that the written judg1nent 
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did not include that amount, and that, when Judge Atherton discovered the 
mistaken omission, she properly corrected the written judgment to comport 
with her verbal order. R123:9-12. 
Utah's Crime Victiln' s Restitution Act ["Restitution Act"] provides 
that the district court "shall determine complete restitution and court-
ordered restitution, and shall make all restitution orders at the time of 
sentencing if feasible, otherwise within one year after sentencing." Utah 
Code Ann.§ 77-38a-302(5)(d)(i) (West Supp. 2005). This Court has held that 
this requires entry of a final restitution order and that a restitution order is 
not final absent "a su1n certain." State v. Poole, 2015 UT App 220, ,Ill, 359 
P.3d 667. Enh·y of an order that anticipates payment of restitution but does 
not include a restitution amount does not meet the statute's requirement. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that when a clerical error occurs in 
the recording of restitution in a final judgment, the district court has 
jurisdiction under rule 30(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, to amend 
the order of restitution to reflect what the judge intended. See State v. 
Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ~~13-34, 218 P.3d 610. Rule 30(b) provides that 
"[c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and 
errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by 
the court nt any time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order." 
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Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b) (emphasis added); see also Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, if13 
(quoting Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b)) (emphasis in Rodrigues). 
Rodrigues pled guilty to criminal nonsupport and agreed to pay 
restitution at a set rate per month. Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, if 4. At sentencing, 
the State provided an incorrect restitution amount to the district court, 
which the court ultimately used when it entered its sentencing order. Id. at 
,r,r?-8. The State later filed a motion under rule 30(b) to amend the 
sentencing order, arguing that the use of an incorrect figure was a clerical 
error arising from the State's use of "the wrong computation" at sentencing. 
Id. at ~9. The trial court granted the motion and increased the total 
restitution amount to conform to the intent of the parties under the plea 
agreement. Id. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that rule 30(b) 
applied and that the district court therefore had jurisdiction to amend the 
restitution order. Id. at if 13. 
The purpose of rule 30(b) "is to correct clerical errors so that the 
record reflects what was actually 'done or intended."' Rodrigues, 2009 UT 
62, ~14 (quoting Bishop v. GenTec, Inc., 2002 UT 36, if 30, 48 P.3d 218 (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). '" A clerical error is one made in recording a 
judgment that results in the enh·y of a judgment which does not conform to 
the actual intention of the court." Id. Whether an error is clerical depends 
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on a three-part analysis: "(1) whether the order or judg1nent that was 
rendered reflects what was done or intended, (2) whether the error is the 
result of judicial reasoning and decision making, and (3) whether the error 
is clear from the record." Id. Application of the analysis to this case 
establishes that a clerical error occurred in entering the written judgment, 
and Judge Atherton had jurisdiction to correct it at any time nunc pro tune. 
First, the original judgment entered after sentencing in October 2010 
did not reflect what was done at sentencing and what was intended by 
Judge Atherton, whose intent is binding. Id. at iJlS. The written judgment 
reflected the order that Defendant "pay restitution," but it did not include a 
restitution amount. R46-47. That is not an accurate reflection of what Judge 
Atherton did at sentencing. The judge not only established a restitution 
amount but" did order restitution as part of the sentence in this case in the 
amount of $126,547 .... " R123:10. What Defendant labels a discussion was, 
in fact, an order requiring Defendant to begin paying restitution for the 
victim's pecuniary damages immediately. The restitution amount imposed 
by Judge Atherton at sentencing was the amount included in the PSI as the 
damages calculated by ACS to be the value of the property taken. R40. She 
emphasized that she did not want the restitution deferred, and directed 
Defendant to begin making "monthly payments every single month toward 
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the restitution" because she wanted ACS "to immediately start getting 
reimbursed for their losses." R122:9-10. She stressed to Defendant that she 
expected him "to make significant advances towards dealing with this 
enormous restitution" to "make your victim whole." R122:10. She said this 
at the end of the sentencing hearing as part of imposing the sentence, 
placing it at the end of her recitation of Defendant's other probation 
conditions. R122:9-10. In light of her directive that Defendant "[p]ay 
restitution" in a sum certain, her imposition of the amount provided in the 
PSI, her explanation of when and how often payments would be made, her 
directive that they begin immediately, and her placement of the 
pronouncement as part of her imposition of sentence, it is clear that Judge 
Atherton intended that Defendant pay restitution in the amount of $126,547 
beginning immediately. Thus, the written judgment did not conform to the 
judge's actual intent, suggesting that the error was clerical. See Rodrigues, 
2009 UT 62, ,Iifl6-22. 
Second, the error in the judgment was not the direct result of judicial 
reasoning and decision making. Id. at if ~23-28. Judge Atherton's 
determination of restitution required judicial reasoning and decision 
making, but the 01nission of the restitution amount from the written 
judgment did not. See id. at if 26 (acceptance of restitution figures and 
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imposition of a restitution amount requires judicial reasoning and decision 
making). The restitution noted in the PSI was the only evidence of 
restitution presented at sentencing. Judge Atherton imposed the PSI amount 
when she announced the sentence and explained why she did so, clearly 
demonstrating the judicial intent and reasoning behind her decision. 
Nothing in the transcript shows that she harbored any intent to delay or 
defer imposition of the restitution amount she announced, even after 
defense counsel voiced his concern about restitution. The absence of the 
restitution amount from the judgment was in no way directed by Judge 
Atherton and, hence, was not the result of judicial reasoning and decision 
making. See id. at ~,r23-28. 
Third, the error is abundantly clear from the record. As noted above, 
the record clearly reflects the requested restitution amount in the PSI and 
Judge Atherton's intent to order restitution in that amount. Further, when 
Judge Atherton corrected the judgment, she only added the restitution 
amount stated in the PSI and imposed by her at sentencing. Compare R46-47 
with R43-45, 53-55. Her actions clearly demonsh·ate the clerical nature of the 
error in recording the judgment. See id. at if if14, 29-34 (an error made in 
recording a judgment that results in entry of a judgment which does not 
conform to the court's intent is a clerical error). 
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Because omitting the restitution figure from the written judg1nent in 
this case constituted a clerical error, Judge Atherton could correct the error 
at any time to reflect what she intended. Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b ). The nunc 
pro tune entry to correct the judgment allowed the correction to relate back 
to the time the original judgment was entered so that the record would 
accurately reflect what originally took place. See State v. Johnson, 2009 UT 
App 382, ,128, 224 P.3d 720 (nune pro tune correction of judgment to 
accurately reflect intended restitution amount related back to time original 
judgment was entered, and no new notice of appeal was required to perfect 
Johnson's direct appeal). Thus, Judge Trease did not abuse her discretion in 
denying Defendant's motion for relief from the restitution order. 
Defendant likens this situation to State v. Poole, 2015 UT App 220. 
Aplt.Br. 15-17. There, this Court held that the Restitution Act requires entry 
of a restitution order with a sum certain within a year of sentencing. 2015 
UT App 220, ~11. Poole does not establish error in this case, however. 
Unlike this case, Poole involved a decision by the trial court to order 
payment of restitution but to leave the amount unspecified until the State 
was able to provide something more than a preliminary estimate. Id. at 
,r,r2, 10. The State provided the information almost a year later, and the 
restitution order was not entered until fifteen months after sentencing. Id. at 
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if 4. This Court vacated the restitution order, holding that without a sum 
certain in the written judgment, the district court lost authority to impose 
restitution once the one-year statutory limitation period passed. Id. at if 21; 
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38a-302(5)(d)(i). 
Here, Judge Atherton did not leave the restitution amount in limbo; 
she imposed a sum certain at sentencing. It was only through a clerical 
error-which may be corrected at any time-that the amount was not 
reflected in the sentencing order. Accordingly, Poole does not govern here. 
2. Allegedly incomplete restitution order. 
Defendant alternatively claims that the restitution order should have 
been vacated because Judge Atherton determined only a partial restitution 
amount and never imposed a final restitution amount within the statutory 
one-year period. Aplt.Br. 17-19. This Court should not reach the merits of 
this argument because Defendant does not acknowledge that it is 
unpreserved, and he argues no exception to the preservation rule. See Veale, 
2012 UT App 131, ,r2. In any event, the claim fails. 
Section 77-38a-302(2) creates two categories of restitution-cmnplete 
and court-ordered. "Complete restitution" is "restitution necessary to 
compensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant." Id. at§ 77-38a-
302(2)(a). "Court-ordered restitution" is the restitution the court" orders the 
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defendant to pay as a part of the crilninal sentence at the time of sentencing 
or within one year after sentencing." Id. at§ 77-38a-302(2)(b). 
Defendant argues that the judge accepted ACS's damages as reported 
in the PSI as the amount of complete restitution and that she wanted 
Defendant to start paying it immediately. Id. at 18-19. He claims, however, 
that the judge intended to add court-ordered restitution once she got the 
necessary documentation on the issue that she requested from defense 
counsel. Id. Because the restitution hearing never occurred, he argues, the 
judge lacked the information necessary to determine court-ordered 
restitution and could not, therefore, determine a final restitution amount. 
Id. Because the court-ordered amount was not imposed within one year 
after sentencing, he argues, the order should have been vacated. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted section 77-38a-302(2) to 
require a trial court to calculate complete restitution, but not court-ordered 
restitution. State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, ,I23, 214 P.3d 104. Rather, the 
"imposition of court-ordered restitution is discretionary .... " Id. at ,I28. 
Defendant's claim that Judge Atherton intended to exercise that 
discretion in favor of determining court-ordered restitution misconstrues 
the record. First, the only record citation he provides for his claim that the 
judge intended to "focus" on court-ordered restitution at the eventual 
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hearing are two lines in the sentencing transcript that state, " ... testing as 
deemed appropriate. Pay restitution in the amount of $126,547." R122:9 
(cited in Aplt.Br. 18-19). This citation has no bearing on the issue of court-
ordered restitution. 
Second, nowhere in the record did the judge determine court-ordered 
restitution or indicate an intent to do so. She was within her discretion not 
to do so under Laycock, particularly where Defendant never raised the issue. 
Third, the sentencing transcript and the PSI not only show that Judge 
Atherton did not intend to determine court-ordered restitution but reveal 
her reasoning as well. See Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38a-302(3) (if the court finds 
restitution inappropriate, it shall make its reasons part of the record). Her 
concern at sentencing centered on having Defendant reimburse ACS for all 
the damage caused by his seven-month crime spree. She commented more 
than once on the excessive size of the debt, was adamant that Defendant 
repay the entire amount to make his victim "whole," recognized it would 
take quite some time, and tried to help ensure that he could make his 
payments to the victim by allowing him to pay his remaining fines and fees 
through community service. R122:5-6, 10. Further, she corrected the 
written judgment to reflect only the complete restitution amount, making 
no provision for court-ordered restitution. R43-45, 53-55. 
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By her efforts, Judge Atherton emphasized the need for total 
reimbursement to the victim and her intent to avoid any drain on 
Defendants' income that would hinder his ability to pay complete 
restitution. This would include foregoing imposition of court-ordered 
restitution. This represents a proper exercise of the judge's discretion and 
does not require that the restitution order be vacated. 
3. Clear causal link between Defendant's criminal 
conduct and ACS' s loss. 
Defendant claims that Judge Trease should have granted him relief 
from the restitution award because the State did not prove that his criminal 
conduct caused the damage suffered by ACS. Aplt.Br. 19-22. He does not 
claim that his conduct did not cause any damage or loss to ACS. He argues 
that the State was required to prove that his actions caused the entire 
restitution amount claimed and that the burden was not met by the 
information contained in the PSI. Id. at 21-22. 
This Court should not reach the merits of this argument because 
Defendant does not acknowledge that it is unpreserved, and he argues no 
exception to the preservation rule. See Veale, 2012 UT App 131, ,I2. In any 
event, the claim fails. 
'"[T]o include an amount in a restitution order, the State must prove 
that the victim has suffered economic injury and that the injury arose out of 
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the defendant's criminal activities."' State v. Poulsen, 2012 UT App 292, ,r11, 
288 P.3d 601 (quoting State v. Brown, 2009 UT App 285, ~10, 221 P.3d 273). 
Criminal activities are "any offense of which the defendant is convicted or 
any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to 
the sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the 
criminal conduct." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-102(2). Restitution may be 
awarded "' only in cases where liability is clear as a matter of law and where 
the commission of the crime clearly establishes causality of the injury or 
damages.'" Poulsen, 2009 UT App 285, ~10 (quoting State v. Robinson, 860 
P.2d 979,983 (Utah App. 1993)). 
To assess causality, Utah courts have adopted a modified 'but for' test 
that requires a showing that: (1) the damages would not have occurred but 
for the conduct underlying the defendant's conviction; and (2) the causal 
nexus between the criminal conduct and the loss is not too attenuated 
(either factually or temporally). Id. (quotations and citations omitted). 
In this case, both prongs of the test are met. First, the record 
demonsh·ates that but for Defendant's criminal conduct, ACS would not 
have suffered the losses. Defendant admitted to police and to the court that 
as a supervisor with ACS, he discounted phones so that he would get them 
for free. R37-38; R121:5-6. He then took them and never returned them to 
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ACS. Id. It is readily apparent that ACS lost the entire value of each of the 
phones Defendant took and that but for Defendant's criminal conduct, none 
of the damage would have occurred. 
Second, there is a direct causal nexus between Defendant's criminal 
activities and the losses suffered by ACS. The losses were both factually and 
temporally tied to Defendant's conduct- he took the phones directly from 
ACS without paying any value for them. The losses increased with each 
stolen phone, and there were no intervening forces, events, or delays. This is 
not like Poulsen, cited by Defendant, in which this Court found no obvious 
causal nexus between Poulsen' s admitted participation in a pyramid 
scheme and the victims' losses. See Poulsen, 2012 UT App 292, if 16. The 
direct relationship between Defendant's criminal conduct here and the 
immediately resulting loss to ACS readily satisfies the second part of the 
causality test. 
Moreover, the PSI provides ample support for the claimed damages. 
It shows that the figure came from ACS and represents a sum certain based 
on business records related to Defendant's actual activities. ACS kept 
sufficiently detailed records that it was able to identify the specific 
employees who were stealing phones, the type of phones being stolen, and 
the amount of loss attributed to each individual's actions. R37-40. 
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Detective Knight of the Salt Lake City Police Deparhnent reviewed ACS 
records and verified the losses incurred because of Defendant over part of 
the seven months. R38. With nothing before her to bring the requested 
amount into question, Judge Atherton did not abuse her discretion in 
relying on the amount as an accurate representation of ACS' s pecuniary 
damages. See, e.g., State v. Weeks, 61 P.3d 1000, 1004-06 (Utah 2002). 
Finally, Defendant claims that by accepting the PSI representations 
and asking defense counsel for more information about restitution, Judge 
Atherton impermissibly shifted the burden of proving restitution to the 
defense. Aplt.Br. 21-22. Judge Atherton did not, however, ask defense 
counsel to carry the State's burden of proving restitution; she required the 
defense to carry its own burden of proving its claim that the requested 
amount was inaccurate. The judge asked defense counsel to include in his 
request for a hearing date "some specifics" that she could review before the 
hearing to prepare for his challenge to the State's requested amount. 
R122:10-11. In context, her discussion with defense counsel made it clear 
that she wanted to be prepared to address the merits of his challenge when 
the hearing occurred. 
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C. Defendant was not entitled to relief from the restitution 
order because the sentencing court complied with its duty 
to allow a hearing. 
Defendant argues that he was entitled to relief from the restitution 
order because the sentencing court denied him a full restitution hearing. 
Aplt.Br. 11-15. He contends that the judge was required to schedule a 
hearing when he objected to the restitution amount imposed at sentencing. 
Id. at 13-14. Requiring him to later formally 1nove for a restitution hearing, 
he claims, was inherently unfair, contrary to the relevant statute, and an 
abuse of discretion. Id. at 14. Finally, he argues that he should not be 
bound by his counsel's failure to file the motion. Id. 
1. Defendant did not preserve his arguments below. 
Defendant's claim fails because it is not preserved, and he has not 
argued plain error or any other exception to the preservation rules. 
When defense counsel told Judge Atherton that he and the prosecutor 
had discussed the possibility of a restitution hearing, the following 
exchange occurred: 
THE COURT: Well, get closer. If there are disputes I - I set a 
lot of these restitution hearings because it's murky. So what I 
want you to do is file a motion for restitution. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. 
THE COURT: And with some specifics about what I can look 
at before we get to the restitution hearing-
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[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right. 
THE COURT: -- and nobody knows anything. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yeah. I don't think it's going to be a 
complicated hearing. The only issue is really addressing his 
availability to pay and those resources he has available to pay 
this whole amount. 
THE COURT: Well, let's get all of that documentation then. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. 
THE COURT: I will set it for hearing. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. And, Your Honor, how long do 
we have to file that motion, just so -
THE COURT: Whenever you want. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. Thank you. 
R122:10-11. Nowhere in this exchange did defense counsel preserve a claim 
of error in the judge's invitation to prepare before scheduling a hearing. 
To "preserve an issue for appeal, a defendant must raise the issue 
before the dish·ict court in such a way that the court is placed on notice of 
potential error and then has the opportunity to correct or avoid the error." 
State v. Diaz-Arevalo, 2008 UT App 219, i110, 189 P.3d 85. This generally 
requires a party to make "a timely and specific objection" in the trial court. 
State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, if17, 192 P.3d 867 (quotation and citation omitted). 
An appellate argument is not preserved unless the objection below was 
based on the same gTounds as the appellate argument. See id. 
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Here, Defendant did not alert Judge Atherton to the specific "error" 
complained of. Defendant did not ask that a hearing be scheduled 
immediately, did not claim to be ready to proceed without further 
investigation, and did not object to the delay or to the need to file a motion 
for a hearing. R122:10-11. The trial court thus was not put on notice that 
Defendant had further complaint and had no opportunity to remedy 
Defendant's perceived problems. 
Instead, Defendant's exchange with the judge smacks of invited error. 
Defense counsel knew of the restitution amount requested in the PSI prior 
to sentencing and had ample opportunity at sentencing to request that a 
hearing be set. R40; R122:3. He did not do so. He affinnatively and 
repeatedly embraced the grace period to prepare his challenge, and then did 
not subsequently request a hearing. See State v. Person, 2006 UT App 288, 
,Ill, 140 P.3d 584 (invited error prevented appellate review when defense 
counsel affirmatively indicated he had no objection to proceeding without a 
hearing then did not request one thereafter); see also State v. McNeil, 2016 UT 
3, 1,I17-23, 803 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (a defendant invites error if it can be said 
that he "'paint[s] himself into his current corner"). 
Further, Defendant did not raise these arguments when he 1noved for 
relief from the restitution order before Judge Trease. R87-89; R123:4-9, 12-
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14. Absent an objection in the district court asserting the same grounds as 
the appellate argument, the issue is not preserved for review on direct 
appeal. Low, 2008 UT 58, if 17. 
Yet Defendant presents his arguments as if they were preserved, 
presenting no argument under any exception to the preservation rule. See 
Aplt.Br. 11-15. Because Defendant has failed to preserve this claim or argue 
an exception to the preservation rule on appeal, this Court should reject it 
on this ground alone. See State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, ,r45, 114 P.3d 551, reh'g 
denied 6/1/2005; State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995); 
Marcroft v. Labor Commission, 2015 UT App 174, ,I4 n.l, 356 P.3d 164 (" An 
appellant proceeds at his peril if preservation or plain error is not dealt with 
in his opening brief."). Should this Court elect to review his arguments, 
they are entitled to no more than plain error review. 
2. Defendant shows no obvious prejudicial error. 
Defendant claims that Judge Atherton denied him a full restitution 
hearing, that it was a violation of the relevant statute and inherently unfair 
to require that he do anything more than object to the restitution amount in 
order to get a hearing, and that Judge Trease abused her discretion by not 
granting him relief from the restitution order on these bases. Aplt.Br. 11-15. 
-34-
It is in the trial court's discretion to impose sentence, which may 
include restitution. See State v. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, ,7, 12 P.3d 110; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(2) & (4) (West Supp. 2010). If "the defendant 
objects to the imposition, a1nount, or distribution of the restitution, the court 
shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue." Utah Code Ann. § 77-
38a-302( 4). 
Here, the sentencing court fully complied with its statutory duty, and 
Defendant cites no authority to the contrary. The sentencing judge imposed 
restitution and, after Defendant objected, expressed her willingness to 
"allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue." Id. The judge discussed 
with defense counsel the need for specific information with which to 
challenge the restitution, then invited counsel to let the court know when 
the documentation was collected, at which point she would "set it for 
hearing." R122:10-11. Thus, far from denying Defendant a hearing, Judge 
Atherton agreed to schedule one as soon as Defendant informed her that he 
was ready to proceed. Defendant need only formally seek a hearing later. 
Not immediately scheduling a hearing was entirely rational where it 
was obvious that Defendant was not yet ready to challenge the restitution 
amount. He told Judge Atherton that "we're still a little bit in question as to 
whether or not that full amount [of restitution] was attributable to him. But 
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it's absolutely clear that it was a lot more than $5,000 attributable to him." 
R122:5. He informed the court that the requested restitution was based on 
"the full retail value" of the stolen phones and explained II that almost 
nobody ever pays" that amount. R122:7. He did not, however, suggest a 
more appropriate amount for use in estimating restitution. Further, he 
explained that he had spoken with the prosecutor II a little while ago" and 
that they "talked about having a restitution hearing to determine what 
court-ordered restitution and total restitution would be." R122:10. But he 
never indicated what they decided, if anything. Thus, Defendant appeared 
to need additional time to investigate - an impression reinforced by defense 
counsel's ready agreement with Judge Atherton's invitation to prepare for 
the hearing before setting a date. R122:10-11 (see invited error argument, 
subsection 1, supra). 
Defendant cites no authority establishing that the sentencing court's 
handling of the issue in this case violates the court's responsibilities under 
Utah's Restitution Act. And the two cases he mentions provide no guidance. 
He cites State v. Haga, where this Court remanded the case to the trial court 
to hold a restitution hearing because Haga requested one, the court 
"informed him he could have one," and no hearing was ever held. 954 P .2d 
1284, 1286, 1289 (Utah App. 1998). The opinion is silent about why the 
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hearing never materialized and, hence, provides no guidance concerning 
the challenged conduct in this case. 
He also cites State v. Gibson, where the trial court immediately 
scheduled a hearing after the parties requested one to settle the restitution 
a1nount to be paid under Gibson's plea agreement. 2009 UT App 108, if if3-
4, 208 P.3d 543. Defendant says that Gibson is relevant because it contains 
no indication that Gibson had to file a motion before the hearing was 
scheduled. Aplt.Br. 12. But merely because one judge does not invite the 
defense to file a motion to schedule a restitution hearing does not show 
error on the part of another judge who does. 
Finally, Defendant's general claim that Utah law somehow insulates 
him from his trial counsel's failure to further pursue a restitution hearing is 
inadequately briefed. See State v. Davie, 2011 UT App 380, if 16, 264 P.3d 770 
(issue is inadequately briefed when its overall analysis is "so lacking as to 
shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court.") (citation 
and quotation omitted); Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). He cites nothing to 
support this claim. Aplt.Br. 14-15. His attempt to distance himself from his 
trial counsel's conduct echoes his ineffectiveness claim, which the State 
addresses in Point II, infra. 
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In sum, Judge Atherton offered- as required by law - to give 
Defendant a restitution hearing and, with it, "a full opportunity" to examine 
and challenge the restitution amount imposed by the court. See Utah Code 
Ann. §77-38a-302(4); State v. Gomez, 887 P.2d 853, 854 (Utah 1994) (holding 
that fundamental principles of procedural fairness in sentencing were met 
when Defendant was provided such an opportunity). Defendant only had 
to ask for it. He did not. He therefore has not shown that he was denied a 
hearing in violation of the Utah Restitution Act. 
II. 
DEFENDANT CANNOT MEET HIS HEAVY BURDEN TO 
OVERCOME STRICKLAND'S STRONG PRESUMPTION 
THAT COUNSEL PERFORMED EFFECTIVELY 
Defendant alternatively argues that his trial counsel was ineffective 
for not timely filing a motion to set a restitution hearing.7 Aplt.Br. 22-25. 
Defendant's claim fails under both prongs of the Strickland analysis. 
7 Defendant also claims that his counsel performed deficiently when 
he failed to "clearly object" to the restitution order at sentencing. Aplt.Br. 
22, 24. The record is clear, however, that counsel objected sufficiently to 
alert the h·ial court to the need for a restitution hearing. R122:5, 7, 10-11. 
Defendant admits as much, stating that he "clearly indicated his objection to 
the a1nount of restitution rec01nmended in the pre-sentence report." 
Aplt.Br. 12. 
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A. The burden is on Defendant to provide an adequate 
record to prove both deficient performance and prejudice. 
To show ineffective assistance, Defendant must first demonstrate that 
trial counsel performed deficiently-Le. that even with the "strong 
presumption that [trial] counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance," the challenged action was objectively 
unreasonable and "could not be considered sound trial strategy."' 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 689 (1984) (citation omitted); State v. 
Gerber, 2015 UT App 76, ~9, 347 P.3d 852; State v. Daniels, 2014 UT App 230, 
~10, 336 P.3d 1074. This burden requires Defendant to demonstrate that 
"there was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions." State v. Clark, 
2004 UT 25, ,I 6, 89 P.3d 162 (emphasis in original) (quotations and citation 
omitted); see also Daniels, 2014 UT App 230, ,I9. 
Defendant must also prove prejudice- i.e., that absent counsel's 
deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that he would have 
received a more favorable result below. See State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 
(Utah 1998). Again, Defendant "bears the burden of establishing prejudice 
as a demonsh·able reality," and "the likelihood of a different result must be 
substantial, not just conceivable." State v. McNeil, 2013 UT App 134, 130, 302 
P.3d 844 (quotations and citations omitted); see also Harrington v. Richter, 131 
S. Ct. 770, 792 (2011). 
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If a defendant fails to establish either deficient performance or 
prejudice, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails as a matter of 
law. Gerber, 2015 UT App 76, 19. 
Defendant bears the added burden of assuring that "the record is 
adequate." An "appellate court will presume that any argument of 
ineffectiveness presented to it is supported by all the relevant evidence of 
which [the] defendant is aware." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ~116-17, 12 
P.3d 92. "Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities 
or deficiencies resulting therefrmn simply will be construed in favor of a 
finding that counsel performed effectively." Id. 
B. Defendant cannot prove deficient performance on this 
record. 
Defendant claims that his counsel performed deficiently when he did 
not file a motion requesting that a restitution hearing be set. Aplt.Br. 22-24. 
He argues that this inaction was objectively unreasonable because counsel 
knew that Defendant disputed the amount and wanted a hearing. Id. at 24. 
Defendant cannot prove deficient performance on this record. 
Although the record reflects that trial counsel did not move for a restitution 
hearing, nothing in the record reveals why he did not do so. Defendant 
assumes that his trial counsel would have presented favorable evidence that 
would have reduced the "incredibly large amount of restitution" that Judge 
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Atherton imposed. Id. at 23-24. Nothing in the record supports such an 
assumption, and Defendant has not sought a rule 23B remand to establish 
record support for his claim. See Utah R. App. P. 23(b). 
Absent record evidence to the contrary, Strickland requires this Court 
to presume that counsel reasonably decided not to request the hearing 
because he did not have evidence to rebut the accuracy of the restitution 
amount. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; see also Lafferty v. State, 2007 UT 73, if 26, 
175 P.3d 530 (court presumes counsel acted reasonably absent contrary 
evidence), reh'g denied 1/4/2008. 
Defense counsel knew the large restitution amount that ACS sought, 
knew the underlying facts, was familiar with Defendant's financial 
situation, and embraced an opportunity to investigate further before 
challenging the restitution amount. His comments at sentencing suggest 
that he intended to investigate how much of the restitution was attributable 
to Defendant, the appropriate valuation of the phones for restitution 
purposes, and Defendant's ability to pay such a large ainount. R122:5, 7, 10-
11. His failure to later pursue a hearing is entirely consistent with a 
sh·ategic determination based on his discoveries that the answers to these 
issues would not benefit, or perhaps would even harm, Defendant. Indeed, 
it is entirely possible that upon review, counsel concluded that if 
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challenged, ACS could show even higher losses than those submitted. R38, 
40 (showing increase in estimated losses attributable to Defendant). 
It is equally possible on this record that counsel found the restitution 
amount to be accurate. The requested sum came directly from the victim's 
business records and extended over seven months. R37-38, 40. The victim 
was able to identify the amounts owing by each of the co-defendants, 
suggesting the existence of detailed records. Id. Where Defendant took a 
large number of new, high-end Blackberries, use of the full retail value of 
the phones would accurately reflect the damage suffered by ACS. R40; 
R122:3-4, 7. Thus, defense counsel may have found that the PSI amount 
reflected an accurate assessment of the financial harm ACS suffered as a 
result of Defendant's actions, negating the need for a hearing. 
And while Defendant may well have difficulty paying the entire 
amount of restitution, that difficulty does not bear on the order for complete 
restitution. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5)(b) (listing relevant facts for 
determining complete restitution; no 1nention of accused's ability to pay). 
In any event, Defendant is not destitute: he has two jobs, the support of 
several people willing to "help out," in-laws who provide rent-free living, 
and a supportive wife who also works. R38-39; R122:7. Thus, defense 
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counsel may have reasonably determined that he had no legitimate basis 
upon which to challenge Defendant's ability to pay the restitution. 
Defendant's claim is, therefore, purely speculative, and this Court 
must presume that counsel performed effectively. See Litherland, 2000 UT 
76, ,I17 ("Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities 
or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a 
finding that counsel performed effectively."); State v. McHugh, 2011 UT App 
62, if 5, 250 P.3d 1006 (rejecting ineffective assistance claim where claim was 
speculative absent evidence of the content of recordings that were not 
before the court); Person, 2006 UT App 288, ,I14 (rejecting speculative 
prejudice claim that was without insight or record support to show what 
information counsel could have provided had he sought to have 
Defendant's plea withdrawn). 
C. Defendant cannot prove prejudice on this record. 
Similarly, Defendant cannot establish on this record that he was 
prejudiced by his trial counsel's decision not to pursue a restitution hearing. 
As noted, Defendant must show that absent counsel's deficient 
performance, there is a reasonable probability that he would have received 
a more favorable result below. See Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50. Here, he can 
prevail only by showing that there is a reasonable probability that the 
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amount of complete restitution would have been reduced if his h·ial counsel 
had obtained a restitution hearing. 
Defendant cannot do so because the record lacks any facts showing 
that the restitution amount was reasonably likely to have changed. He 
identifies no evidence that would have reduced the restitution amount. 
Instead, he recognizes the heavy financial burden he carries because of the 
"incredibly large" restitution amount, then summarily asserts that he has 
been "extremely prejudiced" by the absence of a full restitution ·hearing. 
Aplt.Br. 24. He merely assumes, without establishing, that a restitution 
hearing would have altered the restitution amount and, therefore, lessened 
his burden. And, as noted, the record provides no reason to believe a 
different outcome is reasonably likely to have occurred. 
In sum, Defendant has shown no probability, let alone a reasonable 
one, that defense counsel could have reduced the complete restitution 
determination had he filed a motion to set a restitution hearing. 
Defendant's ineffective assistance claim thus fails. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Judge Trease did not abuse her discretion in denying 
Defendant's motion for relief from the restitution order and his request for a 
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.J 
restitution hearing, and because Defendant's trial counsel was not 
constitutionally ineffective, this Court should affirm Judge Trease's ruling. 
Respectfully submitted on March 4, 2016. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for A ppellee 
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Utah Code Ann. (West Supp. 2005) 
CH.APTER 38a 
CRIME VICTIMS RESTITUTION ACT 
Part 1. General Provisions 
Section 
77-38a-102. Definitions. 
Part 2. Restitution De~ermination 
77-38a-203. Restitution determination-Depart-
ment of Corrections-Presentence 
investigation. 
Section 
Part 3. Restitution Requh-ements 
77-38a-802. Restitution criteria. 
PART 1. GE~ERAL PROVISIONS 
§ 7'l-38a-102. Definitions 
As used in this chap~er: 
(1) "Convic~ion" includes a: 
(a) judgment of guilt; 
(b) a plea of guilty; or 
(c) a plea of no contest .. 
(2) "C1iminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other 
crinrinal conduct for which the defendant· admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or 
vvithout an admission of committing the criminal conduct. · 
· (3) "Department" means the Department of Correcti?llS. 
( 4) "Diversion" means suspending criminal proceedings prior to conviction on the condition 
that a defendant agree to participate in a rehabilitation program, make restitution to the 
vicfan, or fulfill some other condition. 
(5) "Pa..rty" means the prosecutor, defendant, or department involved in a pros.~cution. 
(6) "Pecuniary damages" means all demonsbiable economic inju,ry, whether or not yet 
L.icUi.-i·ed, which a person could recover in a· civil action arising out of the facts or events 
constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the fair market value of property 
taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including lost earnings and medical. 
expenses, but excludes punitive or exemplary damages and pain and suffering. · 
(7) "Plea agreement" means an. agreement entered between the prosecution and defendant 
setting forth the special terms and conditions and ciiminal charges upon which the defendant 
wUi enter a plea of guilty or no contest. 
(8) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a cow-t, upon motion of the prosecution and the 
defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant but not, at that time, 
entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing sentence upon him on condition 
that he comply with specific conditions as set fol-th in a :plea in abeyance agreement. 
(9) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into between the prosecu-
tion and the defendant setting forth the specific terms and conditions upon which, folio-wing 
acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea may be held in abeyance. 
(10) "Plea disposition" means an _agreement entered into between the prosecution and 
defendant including diversion, plea agreement, plea in abeyance agreement, or any agreement 
by whl~h. the defendant may enter a plea in any other jurisdiction or where ch~·ges are 
dismissed without a plea. · · · 
(11) "Restitution'~ means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a 
victim, including prejudgment interest, the accrual of interest from the time of sentencing, 
insured damages, reimbursement for payment of a reward, and payment for expenses to a 
governmental entity for extra_dition or transportation and as may be furt4er defined by law. 
(12)(a) "Reward" means a sum of money: 
(i) offered to the public for information leading to the arrest and conviction of an 
offender; and 
(ii) that has been paid to a person or persons who provide this information, except that 
the person receiving the payment may not be a codefendant, an accomplice, or a bounty 
hunter. 
(b) "Reward" does not include any amount paid in excess of the sum offered to the 
public. · 
. . 
_ (18) "Screening" means the process used by a prosecuting attorney to terminate investiga-
tive action, proceed with prosecution, move to dismiss a prosecution that has been com-
menced, or c~use a prosecution to be clive1-ted. 
(14)(a) ''Victim" means .any person whom the court detennines has suffered pecuniary 
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(b) ''Victim" may not.include a codefendant or accomplice. 
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 3, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2003, c. 278, § 2, eff. ·May 5, 2003; Laws 2005, c. 9G, § 3, 
eff. May 2, 2005. 
PART 2. -RES'lr!TUTION DETERMINATION 
§ 77-38a-203. Restitution detiermination-Depart~ent of Corrections-Pre-
sentence investigation · 
· (l)(a) The department shall prepare a presentence investigation report in accordance with 
Subsection 77-18-1(5). The prosecutor and law enforcement agency involved shall provide all 
available victim information to the department upon request. The victim impact statement 
shall: 
(i) identify all victims of the offense; . 
(ii) itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of the offense; 
(iii) include for each identifiable victim a specific statement of the recommended 
amount of complete restitution as defined in Section 77-38a-302, accompanied by a 
recommendation from the department regarding the payment by the defendant of court-
ordered restitution with interest as defined in Section 77-38a-302; 
(iv) identify any physical; mental, or emotional injuries suffered by the victim as a 
result of the offense, and the seriqusness and perma,nence; 
- (v) describe any change in thB victim's persa.nal welfare or familial relationships as _a 
result of the offense; · 
(vi) identify any request for mental health services initiated · by the _ victim or the 
victim's family as a result of the offense; and · 
(vii) contain any other informa.tion related to the impact of the offense upon the. victim 
or th~ victim's family that the court requires. 
(b) The crime victim shall be re::;ponsible to provide to tlJe department upon request all 
invoices, bills, receipts, and other evidence of injury,- loss of earnings, and out-of-pocket 
loss. The crim!;! victim shall also provide upon request: . _. _ 
(i) all:docum~ntation and; evidence of compensation or reimbursement :fr~m insui·ance 
companies or agencies of the -state of Utah, any . other state, or federal government 
received as· a •direct result of the crime for injury, loss, earnings, or out-of-pocket loss; 
· .and 
(ii) proof of identification, including date of birth, Social Security number, drivers 
license munber, next of }Qn, and home and work address and telephone numbers. 
(c) The inability, failure, or refusal of the crime victim to provide all or part of the 
requested information shall re~ult in the cow-t determining restitution based on the best 
information available. 
(2)(a) The cow-t shall order the defendant as part of the presentence investigation to 
submit to the department any information determined necessary to be disclosed for the 
pm-pose of ascertaining the restitution. 
(b) The willful failure or refusal of the defendant to provide all or part of the requisite 
information shall constitute a waiver of any grounds to appeal or seek future amendment or 
. ~,,Jteration of the restitution order predicated on .the undisclosed information. 
(c) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution 
1:ecommended in the presentence investigation, the court shall set a hearing date to resolve· 
the matter. 
(d) If any party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at 
the time of sentencing, that matter shall be c01Jsidered to be waived. 
Lmvs 2001, c. 137, § 6, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2005, c. 96, § 4, eff. May 2, 2005. 
PART 3. RESTITUTION REQUIREMENTS 
§ 77-38a-302. · Restitution criteria 
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecwliary 
damages~ in addition to any other sentenc~ it may impose, the court shall order that the 
defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this chapter, or for conduct for 
·which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as pa.rt of a plea disposition. For 
pm1Joses of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102(14) and 
in determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and 
procedures as provided in Subsections (2) through (5). 
(2) In determining restitution, the cowt shall determine complete restitution and cow-t-
ordered restitution. 
. (a) "Complete restitution" means .restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all 
losses caused by.the defendant. · . 
(b) "Cow-t-ordered restitution" means the restitution the cowt having criminal jurisdic-
tion orders the clefemlaI'it"'wpay as a part of the criminal sentenc~ at the time of sentencing 
or within one ear after sentencin . , · (c · Complete restitution and. cow-=t-'ordered restitution shall be determined as provided in 
Subsection (5). 
(3) If the coW"'t determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropliate under this pa.1:t, 
t..he court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the colllt record. · 
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the-restitution, the 
court shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5)(a) For the purpose of determ.ining restitution for an offense, th'? offense shall include 
. any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the .sentencing court or to which the 
defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense that involves as an_ element a 
scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly ha.1'1Tied by 
the · defendant's criminal conduct in the cow·se of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, the 
com·t shall consider all relevant facts, includiug: · 
(i) the ~ost. of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in dam~ge to or loss or 
destruction of property of a victim of. the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices relating 
to physical or men~ health care, including nonmedical i;are and treatment rendered in 
accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; 
(ill) the cost of necessary. physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; 
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense resulted in 
bodily injury to a victim; 
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are lost due to 
theft of or damage to tools or equipmeri.t items of a trade that were owned by the victim 
2.nd were essential to the victim's current employment at the tim!:! of the offense; and 
. (vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the 
death of a victim. 
(c) In detei-mining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered restitution, 
the court shall consider the factors liste9 in Subsections (5)(a) and (b) and: 
• § 77-38a-302 CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the bw·den that payment of restitution 
·will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant; · 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other 
conditions to be fixed by the court; · · 
· (iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defe~dant of the payment of l"';!Stitution and the 
method of payment; and 
(iv) other circun1stances which the court determines may make restitution inappropri-
ate. · · 
(d)(i) Except as provided in· Subsection (5)(d)(ii), the cow-t shall determine complete 
restitution and court-ordered restitution, and shall make all restitution orders at the time of 
s_entencing if feasible, otherwise vY.ithin one year after sentencmg. 
(ii) Any pecwlia.1-y damages that have not been determined by the comt within. one 
year after· sentencing may be d<?termined by the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
(e) The Board of Pardons and Parole may, within one year after sentencing, refer an 
o:r:der of judgment . and commitment back to the court for determination of restitution. 
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 81 eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 13, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2002, c. 185, 
§ 51, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 28!5, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2005, c. 96, § 5, eff. May 2, 2005. 
Utah Code Ann. (West 2004) 
§ 77-38a-301. Restitution-Convicted defendant may be required to pay 
In a criminal action, the court may require a convicted defendant to make 
restitution. 
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 7, eff. April 30, 2001. 
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* * * 
THE COURT: Mr. Speed, Your Honor, if you would 
4 please call that case. 
5 
6 
THE COURT: Yeah. This is sentencing? 
MR. VAN DE CAMP: It is, Judge. And you may have 
7 are pretty familiar with this situation because I think you 
8 sentenced a couple of the co-defendants already. 
9 
10 
THE COURT: Oh, I'm very familiar. 
MR. VAN DE CAMP: Right. 
11 THE COURT: And I thought the last time was the last 
12 person but Mr. Speed isn't even the last person. 
13 MR. VAN DE CAMP: And according to this, there is 




THE COURT: One more coming up. 
MR. VAN DE CAMP: scheduled for the 29th. 
THE COURT: In a couple weeks. 
18 All right. Mr. Speed, you're before me today for 
19 sentencing. Entered a plea of guilty to attempted theft by 
20 deception, a third degree felony. I have reviewed the 
21 presentence report. 




MR. VAN DE CAMP: We have gone through it, Judge. 
THE COURT: And Mr. Sanders, have you reviewed that? 





MR. SANDERS: Yes, Your Honor. We will submit on the 
PSR recommendations. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
·MR. VAN DE CAMP: Actually, I think that's incorrect. 
5 I spoke with Mr. Renteria this morning and the State's position 
6 is that they're going to recommend probation without any 
7 additional jail time. 
8 
9 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SANDERS: Actually -- well, Your Honor, unless 
10 Mr. Renteria comes, the State's position will remain that we 
11 submit on the recommendations. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 12 
13 MR. VAN DE CAMP: Okay. I mean, he was just here. I 
14 don't know why he left but ... 
15 
16 
THE COURT: That's fine. 
MR. VAN DE CAMP: We're asking the Court to not 
17 impose jail time. He's done six days. This is really his 
18 first incident. And if you look in terms of timing, he's on 
19 probation on it for another case, but that probation occurred 
20 after the after this offense date. 
21 Jason has taken full responsibility for this. He's 
22 gotten two jobs recently to -- in anticipation of having a 
23 large financial obligation related to this case. As he said in 
24 his statement -- and I don't think there is an issue of him 
25 taking responsibility. 
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1 And I think that this situation spiraled out of 
2 control for him as well as everyone else that was working 
3 there. A lot more money has been attributed to him, and we're 
4 still a little bit in question as to whether or not that full 
5 amount was attributable to him. But it's absolutely clear that 
6 it was a lot more than $5,000 attributable to him. 
7 And itls really just a matter of what kind of 
8 punishment the Court would like to impose for this crime. 
9 Jason, because of these two jobs, he's really doing very well. 







THE COURT: What has he put aside for restitution 
:MR.. VAN DE CAMP: I don't know that. 
How much have you put aside? 
THE DEFENDANT: Actually, nothing aside. I've just 
17 been trying to catch up on previous debt that I've had. 
18 THE COURT: Well, this debt is huge. I mean, you are 
19 more responsible, by far, than any of your co-defendants. 
20 Ten, 15 times more -- more restitution than the others. And 
21 I'm concerned that you've done nothing to address the issue of 
22 restitution that exceeds $126,000. I don't even how someone 
23 could steal that many phones and not get caught earlier. 
24 It's -- I'm baffled by every one of you and I've seen 
25 every one of you. Now that you were all in supervisory 
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1 positions at this phone company, you were given 
2 responsibilities and each of you violated the trust of your 
3 employer dramatically. You the most dramatically. I'm 
4 stunned, really, when I see this type of an offense of just 
5 simply taking and taking and taking to your own benefit. I 
6 don ' t know. 
7 Mr. Van De Camp. 
8 MR. VAN DE CAMP: I mean, Judge, it really speaks for 
9 itself. It got out of control and it's hard to stop when free 
10 money is available. It is something that they hadn't done --
11 THE COURT: Well, it's free money because you steal 
12 something. 
13 MR. VAN DE CAMP: Right. 
14 THE COURT: You sell something that you don't --
15 MR. VAN DE CAMP: Right. 
16 THE COURT: So it's not really free. 
17 MR. VAN DE CAMP: It seemed free to them at the time 
18 and --
19 THE COURT: It's a two-part theft. 
20 MR. VAN DE CAMP: -- certainly wasn't. 
21 THE COURT: You're not just -- you didn't just steal 
22 it, you then sold it to your own benefit and so --
23 MR. VAN DE CAMP: Yeah. 
24 THE COURT: It's 
25 MR. VAN DE CAMP: Well it 
Noteworthy Reporting 801.634.5549 6 
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1 THE COURT: And did it many, many, many, many times. 
2 MR. VAN DE CAMP: I hate to back up, but, I mean, he 
3 gave some to friends, he gave some to family. He made a lot of 
4 very serious mistakes. He sold some for cash. He certainly 
5 didn't receive this much money. 
6 This is the full retail value of these phones. I 
7 mean, we all know that full retail value is an amount that 
8 almost nobody ever pays. It's always re-couped through bills 
9 and things like that. But this is based on full value for all 
10 of these phones, and they're just not cheap phones, if you do 
11 pay full retail value. And that's why they added up so 
12 quickly. It's probably hundred phones or so is --
THE COURT: That's --
MR. VAN DE CAMP: the total amount. 




16 MR. VAN DE CAMP: It's a lot. It's more than a few. 
17 It's a lot of phones and it's a very serious offense. 
18 And the reality with Jason is that he's doing very 
19 well. He just got married. His wife is very supportive. She 
20 works. He works. He's got two jobs. He works at TGI Friday's 
21 and then PETCO. He makes $7.50 an hour at PETCO. He makes, 
22 you know, not very good wages at F~iday's. It's -- he just 
23 doesn't do that well there. 
24 THE DEFENDANT: For the record, I have been looking 
25 for other employment for more opportunity for money. Just it's 
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1 not a lot [inaudible] out there. But I mean, I'm not going to 
2 stop looking just because it's not available. I'm going to 
3 keep looking. Keep that drive. 
4 MR. VAN DE CAMP: I think the Court knows that this 
5 is going to result in a felony conviction. It's going to enter 
6 on this record today. He got these jobs before it was going to 
7 enter. His likelihood of getting more jobs to pay this 
8 restitution off is going to decrease in the future. 
9 THE COURT: Indeed. 
10 MR. VAN DE CAMP: I mean, there is no doubt about 
11 that. He's willing to -- I mean, I think maybe in this case 
12 rather than him doing the extra 24 days as AP&P recommends, 
13 assuming the Court would follow that recommendation, rather 
14 than him doing that, community service would benefit him and 
15 the community more than him spending 24 days in our Salt Lake 
16 County Jail. 
17 
18 to say? 
19 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Speed, anything you wish 
THE DEFENDANT: I would just like to express my 
20 sincere apologizes for the actions that I have taken that have 
21 gotten me he~e. I know I have nothing to say that can justify 
22 the things that I have done, but I would like ask for mercy for 
23 the reason of wanting a chance [inaudible] court can do. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. Sentencing as follows: I'm 
25 ordering that you serve an indeterminate term at the Utah State 
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1 Prison of Oto 5 years. I am suspending all but six days of 
2 that with credit for six days served. 
3 In lieu of further jail time, I'm ordering that you 
4 perform 150 hours of community service to be completed by 
5 January the 1st of next year; no leeway. And that means that 
6 you're going to have to work double hard. We're going into a 
7 season where there should be plenty of community service 
8 available, more than other times of the year. 
9 I'm placing you on probation for 36 months through 
10 the supervision of Adult Probation and Parole. During that 
11 period of time, you are to be on good behavior. That means 
12 that you are not to come before this court or any other court 
13 on anything other than a minor traffic offense. You are to 
14 comply with all conditions placed upon you, including but not 
15 limited to having no contact with co-defendants, maintain full 
16 time employment, no drugs, no alcohol, submit to random drug 
17 testing as deemed appropriate. Pay restitution in the amount 






Mr. Van De Camp, I will let you approach later. 
MR. VAN DE CAMP: Right. 
THE COURT: But I want to get this on --
MR. VAN DE CAMP: Right. 
THE COURT: rather than deferring it. I want you 
24 to make monthly payments every single month toward the 
25 restitution. I will let you work with AP&P towards that, but I 
Noteworthy Reporting 801.634.5549 9 
1 want them to immediately start getting reimbursed for their 
2 losses. A fine and surcharge of $750. Attorneys fees of $250. 
3 So I will work your fine off in community service at a rate of 
4 $7 per hour and you can work with that. 
5 But I'm -- I'm giving you that opportunity, 
6 Mr. Speed, and I really expect you to make significant advances 
7 towards dealing with this enormous restitution, that you need 
8 to make your victim whole. Wait for a moment. We will give 
9 you the information. You need to check in at AP&P on Monday. 
10 MR. VAN DE CAMP: And Your Honor, speaking with 
11 Mr. Renteria a little while ago, we talked about having a 
12 restitution hearing to determine what court-ordered restitution 
13 and total restitution would be. 
14 THE COURT: Well, get closer. If there are disputes 
15 I -- I set a lot of these restitution hearings because it's 
16 murky. So what I want you to do is file a motion for 
17 restitution. 
MR. VAN DE CAMP: Okay. 18 
19 THE COURT: And with some specifics about what I can 




MR. VAN DE CAMP: Right. 
THE COURT: -- and nobody knows anything. 
MR. VAN DE CAMP: Yeah. I think it's not a 
24 complicated -- I don't think it's going to be a complicated 
25 hearing. The only issue is really addressing his availability 































and those resources he has available to pay this whole 
THE COURT: Well, let's get all of that documentation 
MR. VAN DE CAMP: Okay. 
THE COURT: I will set it for hearing. 
MR. VAN DE CAMP: Okay. And, Your Honor, how long do 
to file that motion, just so --
THE COURT: Whenever you want. 
MR. VAN DE CAMP: Okay. Thank you. 
{End of hearing. } 











STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
) ) ss 
) 
I, KATIE HARMON, a Certified Shorthand Reporter in 
11 and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify that I received 
12 the audio recording in this matter, and that I transcribed it 
13 into typewriting and that a full,· true and correct 
14 transcription of said audio recording so recorded and 
15 transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages, inclusive 










DATED this 13th day of February, 2015. 
KATIE HARMON, RPR, CSR 
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Addendum C 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JASON M SPEED, 
Defendant. 
PRESENT 
Clerk: j ennifaj 
Prosecutor: SANDERS, NATHANIEL J 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 101901272 FS 
Judge: JUDITH S. ATHERTON 
Date: October 15, 2010 
Defendant's Attorney(s): VAN DE KAMP, BROCK A 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: March 11, 1984 
Sheriff Office#: 334008 
Video 
Tape Number: s4 5 Tape Count : · 11 : 2 3 -
CHARGES 
1. ATTEMPTED THEFT BY DECEPTION (amended) - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/13/2010 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED THEFT BY DECEPTION 
a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate 
term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant 1 s conviction of ATTEMPTED THEFT BY DECEPTION 
a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 6 
day(s) 
Credit is granted for time served. 
Credit is granted for 6 day(s) previously served. 
SENTENCE FINE 














Case No: 101901272 Date: Oct 15, 2010 
SENTENCE FINE SUSPENDED NOTE 
court will allow for fine to be worked off in community service at 
a rate of $7 per hour 
COMMUNITY SERVICE 
Complete 150 hour(s) of community service. 
Community service is to be completed by February 1, 2011. 
Attorney Fees Amount: $250.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: SALT LAKE COUNTY TREASURE 
Restitution: Amount: $126547.00 
Pay in behalf of: ACS, INC 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 6 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 750.00 which includes the surcharge. 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Violate no laws. 
Comply with all standard drug & alcohol conditions imposed by 
probation agency. 
Do not use, consume, or possess alcohol or illegal drugs; nor 
associate with any persons using, possessing or consuming alcohol 
or illegal drugs. 
Do not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold or otherwise 
distributed illegally. 
Submit to breath and/or urine testing for drugs or alcohol upon the 
request of any law enforcement officer. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
No contact with Co-Defendants 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




Prosecutor: SANDERS, NATHANIEL J 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 101901272 FS 
Judge: JUDITH S. ATHERTON 
Date: October 15, 2010 
Defendant's Atto~ney(s): VAN DE KAMP, BROCK A 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: March 11, 1984 
Video 
Tape Number: s45 Tape Count: 11:23-
CHARGES 
1. ATTEMPTED THEFT BY DECEPTION (amended) - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/13/2010 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED THEFT BY DECEPTION 
a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate 
term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the.defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED THEFT BY DECEPTION 
a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 6 
day(s) 
Credit is granted for time served. 
Credit is granted for 6 day(s) previously served. 
SENTENCE FINE 




Total Fine: $750.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $362.43 
Total Principal Due: $750.00 
Plus Interest 
Page 1 
Case No: 101901272 Date: Oct 15, 2010 
SENTENCE FINE SUSPENDED NOTE 
· court will allow for fine to be worked off in community service at ~ 
a rate of $7 per hour 
COMMUNITY SERVICE 
Complete 150 hour(s) of community service. 
Community service is to be completed by February 1, 2011. 
Attorney Fees Amount: $250.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: SALT LAKE COUNTY TREASURE 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 6 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 750.00 which includes the surcharge. 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Violate no laws. 
Comply with all standard drug & alcohol conditions imposed by 
probation agency. 
Do not use, consume, or possess alcohol or illegal drugs; nor 
associate with any persons using, possessing or consuming alcohol 
or illegal drugs. . 
Do not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold or otherwise 
distributed illegally. 
Submit to breath and/or urine testing for drugs or alcohol upon the 
request of any law enforcement officer. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
No contact with Co-Defendants 
Maintain full time employement 
Pay Restitution· 
I 
(t> /,~II ~ Date: 
I I UDITH S. District 
l,-' 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




Prosecutor: SANDERS, NATHANIEL J 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SEN.TENCE, JUDGMENT, COMM! TMENT 
Case No.: 10190i272 FS 
Judge: JUDITH S. ATHERTON 
.Date: October 15, 2010 
Def.endant ' s Attorney { s) : VAN DE KAMP, BROCK A 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth~- March 11, 1984 
sheriff Office#: 334008 
Video 
Tape Number: s45 Tape Count: ·11:23-
CHARGES 
1. ATTEMPTED THEFT BY DECEPTION {amended) - 3rd Degre:e Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/13/2010 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's. conviction of ATTEMPTED THEFT BY DECEPTION 
a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate 
term of :p:ot to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED THEFT BY DECEPTION 
a 3rd De·g~ee: 1":e'lony 1 the defendant is s·entenced to a term of 6· 
day .(s) 
Credit is granted for time served. 
Credit is· granted for 6 day(s) previously served. 
SENTENCE FINE 














Case No: io1~0l272 Date: Oct 15, 2010 
SENTENCE FINE SUSPENDED NOTE 
court will allow fo·r f.ine to be worked off in community service at 
a rate of $7 per hour 
COMMUNITY SERVICE 
Complete 150 hour(s) of community service. 
Community service is to. be completed by February 1, 2011. 
Attorney Fee-s Amount: $250. 00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: .SALT LAKE: COUNTY TREASURE 
Restitution: Amount: $12 6.54 7. O O 
Pay in behalf of: ACS., INC 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defe.ndant to serve 6 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is t.o pay a fine of 750.00 which includes the surcharge. 
I.nterest may increase the final amount due. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual. and-ordinary conditions required by Adult Probation & Parole . 
. Violate no laws. 
Comply with all standard d;rug & alcohol conditipns imposed :Py 
probation. agency. 
Do not use, consume, 6.r possess alcohol or ill:egal drugs; nor 
as~ociate ~ith any persons using, possepsing or consuming alcohol 
or illegal drugs. 
Do not. frequent any place where drugs are us~d, sold or otherwis.e 
distributed illegally. 
Submit to breath and/or urine testing for drugs or alcohol upon the 
request of any· law enforcement officer. 
Refrain f:r;-om the use of alcoholic beverages. 
No coptact with Co-Defendants 
Maintain full time employement 
!?age 2 
Case No: 101901272 Date: Oct 15, 
Pay Restitution 
Date: 10-\S'-\V 
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Addendum D 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
~,APPEALED: CASE #20150011 
STATE OF UTAH vs. JASON M SPEED 
CASE NUMBER 101901272 State Felony 
Defendants DANIEL SCOTT MURRAY, SERGIO JOEL MENDOZA, TINA MARIE INGER, 
JASON M SPEED, are linked. 
~ 
CHARGES 
Charge 1 - 76-6-405 - ATTEMPTED THEFT BY DECEPTION 2nd Degree 
Felony (amended) to 3rd Degree Felony 
Offense Date: June 01, 2009 
Plea: August 13, 2010 Guilty 
Disposition: August 13, 2010 Guilty 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
PARTIES 
VERNICE TREASE 
Bondsman - DEWEY'S BAIL BOND COMPANY 
Defendant - JASON M SPEED 
Represented py: JOAN C WATT 
Represented by: BROCK A VAN DE KAMP 
Represented by: ALLYSON L BARKER 
Plaintiff - STATE OF UTAH 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Defendant Name: JASON M SPEED 
Offense tracking number: 33905449 
Date of Birth: March 11, 1984 
Jail Booking Number: 10011395 
Law Enforcement Agency: SALT LAKE CITY PD 
LEA Case Number: 09-197107 
Prosecuting Agency: SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Agency Case Number: 10004490 
Sheriff Office Number: 334008 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 




Printed: 03/04/16 11:17:13 Page 1 
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CASE NUMBER 101901272 State Felony 
CASE NOTE 
Balance: 









REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY 
Amount Due: 10.00 
Amount Paid: 10.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY 
Amount Due: 10.00 
Amount Paid: 10.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
NONMONETARY BOND DETAIL - TYPE: Surety 







DAO#l 0004 4 90 
PROCEEDINGS 
02-19-10 Case filed 
02-19-10 Filed: From an Information 
02-19-10 Notice - WARRANT for Case 101901272 ID 12773424 
02-19-10 Judge DENO HIMONAS assigned. 
02-19-10 Filed: Information 
02-19-10 Note: CASE FILED BY DET BOELTER OF SLCPD. WARRANT ACTIVE 
02-19-10 Warrant ordered on: February 19, 2010 Warrant Num: 985189728 
Bail Allowed 
Bail amount: 10000.00 
02-19-10 Warrant issued on: February 19, 2010 Warrant Num: 985189728 
Bail Allowed 
Bail amount: 10000.00 
Judge: ANTHONY B QUINN 
Issue reason: Based on the probable cause statement. 
Printed: 03/04/16 11:17:13 Page 2 
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CASE NUMBER 101901272 State Felony 
~ 02-24-10 Judge JUDITH S ATHERTON assigned. 
02-24-10 Note: Assigned judge changed on the filing screen per Ad.min 
Rule 04-01 
03-02-10 Warrant recalled on: March 02, 2010 Warrant num: 985189728 
Recall reason: Warrant recalled because defendant was 
booked. 
03-02-10 INITIAL APPEARANCE/JAIL scheduled on March 03, 2010 at 09:00 AM 
with Judge ARR. 
03-03-10 ROLL CALL scheduled on March 11, 2010 at 02:00 PM with Judge 
Vil HILDER. 
03-03-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for Appointment of Counsel 
Judge: TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
PRESENT 
Clerk: tinaa 
Prosecutor: PETRIK, HOLLY A 
Defendant 
Audio 
Tape Number: er s31 Tape Count: 10.02 
INITIAL APPEARANCE 
A copy of the Information is given to the defendant. 
The Information is read. 
Advised of charges and penalties. 
The defendant is advised that this offense may be used as an 
enhancement to the penalties for a subsequent offense. 
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
Court finds the defendant indigent and appoints Salt Lake Legal 
Defenders to represent the defendant. 
Appointed Counsel: 
Name: Salt Lake Legal Defenders 
Address: 424 East 500 South Suite #101 
City: Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Phone: 532-5444 
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CASE NUMBER 101901272 State Felony 
03-03-10 
03-03-10 
Affidavit of indigency is to be submitted by the defendant 
Instructions to the defendant: 
1. You are to immediately contact and consult with appointed 
counsel. 
2. You are to cooperate with 
of this case. 
appointed counsel in the defense 
3. You are to keep appointed counsel advised at all times of an 
address and a telephone number where you can be reached. 
4. Attorney's fees for services of counsel may be assessed at the 
time of sentence. 
ROLL CALL is scheduled. 
Date: 03/11/2010 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: To Be Determined 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
Salt Lake City, UT 
Before Judge: ROBERT K HILDER 
Note: BAIL REMAINS THE SAME 
Filed: DEF'S INFORMATION FROM PTS 
84111 
03-03-10 Note: Affidavit of Indignecy filed and approved by Judge Medley 
03-08-10 Note: Dewey's Bail Bond #N/A $10,000.00 posted bond on 
03/06/10. A Roll Call has been set for 03/11/10 before 
Judge Hilder. Bond was posted on 03/08/10. 
03-08-10 Bond Account created Total Due: 10000.00 
03-08-10 Bond Posted Non-Monetary Bond: 10,000.00 
03-09-10 Filed: Appearance Of Counsel 
03-09-10 Filed: Formal Request For Discovery Pursuant To Rule 16 Of The 
Rules Of Criminal Procedure 
03-11-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for Roll Call 
Judge: ROBERT K HILDER 
PRESENT 
Printed: 03/04/16 11:17:13 Page 4 
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CASE NUMBER 101901272 State Felony 
Clerk: terryb 
Prosecutor: BLAYLOCK, ROGERS 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): VAN DE KAMP, BROCK A 
Video 
Tape Number: N 45 Tape Count: 3.35 
HEARING 
C/O Case set for Resolution hearing. 
Defendant appeared out of custody. 
RESO.LUTION HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 04/08/2010 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: To Be Determined 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Before Judge: ROBIN W. REESE 
03-12-10 RESOLUTION HEARING scheduled on April 08, 2010 at 02:00 PM with 
Judge REESE. 
04-08-10 Preliminary Hearing scheduled on May 04, 2010 at 09:00 AM in 
~ FOURTH FLOOR-W45 with Judge TREASE. 
04-08-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for Resolution Hearing 
Judge: ROBIN W. REESE 
PRESENT 
Clerk: terryb 
Prosecutor: ROSE, MANDY L 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): VAN DE KAMP, BROCK A 
Video 
Tape Number: s 32 Tape Count: 4.18 
HEARING 
TAPE: S 32 COUNT: 4.18 
Court Orders Case set for Preliminary Hearing 
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CASE NUMBER 101901272 State Felony 
Defendant appeared out of custody. 
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 05/04/2010 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W45 
Before Judge: TREASE, VERNICE 
05-04-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for Preliminary Hearing 
Judge: VERNICE TREASE 
PRESENT 
Clerk: jennifew 
Prosecutor: SANCHEZ, CORAL 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): VAN DE KAMP, BROCK A 
Video 
Tape Number: cd Tape Count: 10:40 
HEARING 
This matter is before the court for a preliminary hearing. 
Defendant waives his right to a preliminary hearing. Defendant 
waives his right to a speedy trial. 
CASE BOUNDOVER 
Defendant waived preliminary hearing, State consenting thereto. 
This case is bound over. An Arraignment hearing has been set on 
7/9/2010 at 9:00 AM in courtroom S45 before Judge JUDITH S. 
ATHERTON. 
05-04-10 ARRAIGNMENT scheduled on July 09, 2010 at 09:00 AM in FOURTH 
FLOOR-S45 with Judge ATHERTON. 
05-04-10 Note: Case Bound Over 
07-09-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for Arraignment 
Judge: JUDITH S. ATHERTON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: jennifaj 
Prosecutor: SHUMAN, JON D 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): VAN DE KAMP, BROCK A 
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CASE NUMBER 101901272 State Felony 
Video 
Tape Number: S45 Tape Count: 11:46-
ARRAIGNMENT 
Defendant waives reading of Information. 
Counsel requests for a disposition date 
DISPOSITION is scheduled. 
Date: 08/13/2010 
T irne : 0 9 : 0 0 a . rn . 
Location: Fourth Floor - S45 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JUDITH S. ATHERTON 
07-09-10 DISPOSITION scheduled on August 13, 2010 at 09:00 AM in FOURTH 
FLOOR-S45 with Judge ATHERTON. 
08-13-10 Filed order: Statment of defendant in support of guilty plea 
and certificate of counsel 
Judge JUDITH s ATHERTON 
Signed August 13, 2010 
08-13-10 SENTENCING scheduled on October 15, 2010 at 09:00 AM in FOURTH 
FLOOR-S45 with Judge ATHERTON. 
0N 08-13-10 Charge 1 Disposition is Guilty 
08-13-10 Charge 1 amended to 3rd Degree Felony 
08-13-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for Change of Plea 
Judge: JUDITH S. ATHERTON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: j ennif aj 
Prosecutor: GIBBON, STEVEN C 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): VAN DE KAMP, BROCK A 
Video 
Tape Number: s45 Tape Count: 11:37-
The Information is read. 
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties. 
Defendant waives time for sentence. 
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CASE NUMBER 101901272 State Felony 
A pre-sentence investigation was ordered. 
The Judge orders Adult Probation & Parole to prepare a Pre-sentence 
report. 
Change of Plea Note 
Defendant pleas guilty to count one as amended by motion of the 
state 
SENTENCING is scheduled. 
Date: 10/15/2010 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - S45 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JUDITH S. ATHERTON 
08-13-10 Filed: PSR Referral 
10-12-10 ****PRIVATE**** Filed: AP&P Pre-Sentence Report 
10-15-10 Bond Exonerated -10,000.00 
10-15-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITME 
Judge: JUDITH S. ATHERTON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: jennifaj 
Prosecutor: SANDERS, NATHANIEL J 
Defendant 
Defendant 1 s Attorney(s): VAN DE KAMP, BROCK A 
Sheriff Office#: 334008 
Video 
Tape Number: s45 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Tape Count: 11:23-
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED THEFT BY DECEPTION 
a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate 
term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED THEFT BY DECEPTION 
a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 6 
day(s) 
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CASE NUMBER 101901272 State Felony 
Credit is granted for time served. 
Credit is granted for 6 day (s) 
SENTENCE FINE 




Total Fine: $750.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $362.43 
Total Principal Due: $750.00 
previously 
Plus Interest 
SENTENCE FINE SUSPENDED NOTE 
served. 
court will allow for fine to be worked off in community service at 
a rate of $7 per hour 
COMMUNITY SERVICE 
Complete 150 hour(s) of community service. 
Community service is to be completed by February 1, 2011. 
Attorney Fees Amount: $250.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: SALT LAKE COUNTY TREASURE 
Restitution: Amount: $126547.00 
Pay in behalf of: ACS, INC 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 6 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 750.00 which includes the surcharge. 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Violate no laws. 
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Page 9 of 15 
CASE NUMBER 101901272 State Felony 
Comply with all standard drug & alcohol conditions imposed by 
probation agency. 
Do not use, consume, or possess alcohol or illegal drugs; nor 
associate with any persons using, possessing or consuming alcohol 
or illegal drugs. 
Do not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold or otherwise 
distributed illegally. 
Submit to breath and/or urine testing for drugs or alcohol upon the 
request of any law enforcement officer. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
No contact with Co-Defendants 
Maintain full time employement 
Pay Restitution 
10-18-10 Note: SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT minutes modified. 
10-19-10 Judgment #1 Entered$ 250.00 
Creditor: SALT LAKE COUNTY TREASURE 
Debtor: JASON M SPEED 
250.00 Attorneys Fee's 
250.00 Judgment Grand Total 
10-19-10 Filed judgment: Minutes Sentence, Judgment, Commitment 
Judge JUDITH S ATHERTON 
Signed October 15, 2010 
02-16-11 Note: AP&P PV Rec'd 
02-22-11 Filed order: Court orders for fine to be dismissed, and 
probation to remaing supervised through ap&p 
Judge JUDITH S ATHERTON 
Signed February 17, 2011 
07-12-11 Note: SLCPS Stay Report 
07-26-11 Filed order: AP&P Progress Violation Report - Denied -
Probation may Not Terminate 
Judge JUDITH S ATHERTON 
Signed July 22, 2011 
02-27-12 Not'e: SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT minutes modified. 
02-27-12 Judgment #2 Entered$ 126547.00 
Creditor: ACS INC 
Debtor: JASON M SPEED 
126,547.00 Restitution 
126,547.00 Judgment Grand Total 
02-27-12 Filed judgment: Minutes Sentence, Judgment, Commitment 
Printed: 03/04/16 11:17:15 Page 10 
Page 10 of 15 
~ 
CASE NUMBER 101901272 State Felony 
Judge JUDITH S ATHERTON 
Signed October 15, 2010 
08-02-13 Judge VERNICE TREASE assigned. 
10-01-13 Minute Entry - MINUTE ENTRY (PVR INPUT) 
Judge: VERNICE TREASE 
The Court has received a Progress/Violation Report from AP&P with 
the recommendation that defendant's probation be allowed to 
terminate successfully on October 14, 2013. 
In addition AP&P's interest be closed and any remaining 
financial obligations be referred to Office of State Debt 
Collection. 
The Court gives the prosecution and defense 14 calendar days from 
the date of this minute entry to submit any objections or other 
input regarding AP&P's recommendation. 
Date: 
Judge VERNICE TREASE 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 101901272 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
MAIL: STATE OF UTAH, UT 
MAIL: BROCK A VAN DE KAMP 424 E 500 S SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
10/01/2013 /s/ JENNIFER WILLIAMS 
Date: 
Deputy Court Clerk 
10-16-13 Filed order: AP&P Progress/Violation Report - Having rec'd no 
obj from DA, the cout grants the request to term probation and 
to have remaining restitution, etc sent to OSDC. The court 
notes however that b/c rest is outstanding, termination cannot 
be sue 
Judge VERNICE TREASE 
Signed October 16, 2013 
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CASE NUMBER 101901272 State Felony 
10-16-13 Case Closed 
Disposition Judge is VERNICE TREASE 
10-30-13 Filed: Letter from Defendant 
10-30-13 Minute Entry - MINUTE ENTRY (LETTER FROM DEFENDANT) 
Judge: VERNICE TREASE 
The court has received from the defendant, Jason Speed, a letter 
filed October 30, 2013. It appears that copies of the letter have 
not been provided to counsel for the State nor Defendant's own 
counsel. 
Accordingly, my clerk will provide copies of the letter and this 
minute entry to counsel for the State and Defense. 
Date: 
Judge VERNICE TREASE 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 101901272 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
MAIL: STATE OF UTAH, UT 
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DECEMBER 5, 2014 
* * * 
THE COURT: Case 101901272. State versus 
4 Jason M. Speed. Parties please state their appearances for the 




Allyson Barker on behalf of Jason Speed. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: Roger Blaylock for the State. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. This is set today 
9 based on a motion that was filed by the defense. The motion is 
10 titled "Motion for relief from judgment, request for 
11 restitution hearing and memorandum in support." 
12 I've reviewed everything that has been filed in this 
13 case. And we'll hear any further argument that the parties 
14 have. So let me just talk out loud here for a minute and maybe 
15 that will help direct things. 
16 I've looked at the transcript of the sentencing 
17 hearing. Judge Atherton, in my opinion, did order restitution. 
18 And in fact, she stated an amount at the sentencing, according 
19 to the transcript, right? 
20 And during that she also said: "Mr. Van De Camp, I 
21 will let you approach later, but I want to get this on rather 
22 than deferring it. I want you to make monthly payments every 
23 single month toward the restitution. I will let you work with 
v, 24 AP&P towards that, but I want them to immediately start getting 
25 reimbursed for their losses." 
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1 And then there was a statement the regarding the 
2 attorneys fees and so forth. Subsequent to that, the court 
3 docket doesn't show anything taking place. I'm assuming 
4 Mr. Speed went to AP&P and so forth. 
5 Subsequent to that judgment, sentence, and commitment 
6 and the sentencing hearing, on October 16, 2013, AP&P submitted 
7 a progress violation report requesting that probation be 
8 terminated and that any remaining money that is owed be sent to 
9 debt collection. 
10 As my usual practice, when I received that, I sent a 
11 minute entry out to all parties. The minute entry is scanned 
12 into the court docket and it says something to the effect of: 
13 "AP&P has made a recommendation, they -- and to terminate 
14 probation successfully. That in addition, AP&P's interest be 
15 closed. That any remaining financial obligation be referred to 
16 the Office of State Debt Collection." 
17 There was no input given and so the Court granted 
18 that and sent any outstanding money owed, including the 
19 restitution to the State Debt Collection. That was October 16, 
20 of 2013. And then April in 2014 is when the motion was filed. 
21 And so those are the things that are pertinent to 
22 this hearing today. 
23 Ms. Barker? 
24 MS. BARKER: Your Honor, I'd just like to point out 
25 in the transcript of the sentencing hearing, on the subject of 
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1 restitution, and it's following Judge Atherton's sentencing 
2 order, that the defense -- counsel for the defense talked 
3 about -- says at line six: "We talked about having a 
4 restitution hearing to determine" --
5 
6 
THE COURT: What page are are you on? 
MS. BARKER: I am on Page 8. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. At line six: "Talked about having 
8 a restitution hearing to determine what court-ordered 
9 restitution and total restitution would be." And the Judge 
10 said, "Well, get closer. There are disputes. I set a lot of 
11 these restitution hearings because it's murky. So what I want 
12 you to do is file a motion for restitution with some specifics 
~ 13 about what I can look at before we get to the restitution 
14 hearing and nobody knows anything." 
15 And the Judge ultimately directs the parties to get 
16 that documentation. And at that point, my position is, is that 
17 the burden is then on the State to find out how much money 
18 actually they want to request for restitution. And that the 
19 intent in this case was to have some sort of further proceeding 
20 on restitution and that was never initiated by the State. 
21 There are several progress violations reports that 
22 AP&P submits prior to asking for the matter to be terminated 
23 where the amount of restitution is specifically listed in the 
24 report as "to be terminated." And that once an amount was 
25 determined, Mr. Speed began making restitution payments. 
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1 The first progress violation report was filed on 
2 filed -- in October. I want to make sure I'm getting this 
3 right. No, that's the last one. I beg your pardon. 
4 The final report has the restitution included because 
5 it was made after the Court entered that order. But the 
6 previous ones do not include any other discussion of the 
7 restitution except that it was to be determined. I think that 
8 despite Judge Atherton saying that she order -- that she is 
9 telling -- directing him to pay restitution in the amount of 
10 $126,000, roughly, that the intention of the Court was to have 
11 the parties submit an amount for a restitution hearing and that 
12 would be initiated by the State and then have Mr. Speed's 
13 counsel respond to that. 
14 And that -- that was never done until the year 
15 deadline for determining restitution went by. The Judge's 
16 minutes for the initial sentencing, the minutes of sentence, 
17 judgment, and commitment do not include the ones entered on 
18 October 15th of 2010, do not include an order for him to pay 
19 restitution. That was -- that was not included in that minute 
20 entry and there was no entry of a judgment and commitment, 
21 including the restitution until more than a year had passed. 
22 Mr. Speed has continued to make payments on that 
23 since it's been sent to the Office of State Debt Collection. 
24 He made payments on it as soon as AP&P made him aware of it. 
25 But I think that the intention of the Court was that that was 
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1 going to be a matter that would be addressed later and the 
2 State never initiated that process. And now, there is an order 
3 for restitution that was entered after the year deadline. 
4 THE COURT: Input from the State? 
5 MR. BLAYLOCK: Your Honor, I think the Court's 
6 interpretation is accurate that Judge Atherton did, in fact, 
7 say in her words: Pay restitution in the amount of $126,547 
8 $126,547. She also goes on to talk about the fact that she 
9 expects the defendant to make significant advances towards 
10 dealing with this enormous restitution. 
11 Reflected on our file was that exact amount as being 
12 owed in restitution. Generally, the procedure in this court is 
13 that counsel can request a restitution hearing if is there an 
14 objection to the amount of restitution ordered. That amount 
15 was ordered. Counsel for the defense did nothing to test that 
16 amount of restitution. 
17 The fact that it wasn't included in the further 
18 documentation of the court was a clerical error. It certainly 
19 wasn't, I would suggest, fatal to the fact that restitution 





We'll submit it, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
Ms. Barker. 
MS. BARKER: Your Honor, I think that the Judge's 
25 further remarks following the sentencing order and the fact 
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1 that it's not in the minutes indicates that although that 
2 amount was stated as the restitution amount and the Judge did 
3 want Mr. Speed to begin paying on that, that there was going to 
4 be some dispute about that, the Judge knew it, tasked the State 
5 with -- and counsel for the defense with corning closer to a 
6 resolution. 
7 But, I think that the -- there were other defendants 
8 in this case. Mr. Speed is liable for restitution that is the 
9 consequence of his actions. There were other defendants -- and 
10 this isn't like multiple people damaging a piece of property. 
11 These were cell phones that were taken from a business. It --
12 they -- by employees. It could have been accounted for, who 
13 took the phones. 
14 And $126,000 is an enormous amount of restitution, 
15 but that's not Mr. Speed's portion of the restitution and he 
16 was never afforded an opportunity to have a restitution hearing 
17 on this. If -- I think the State's position is, is that as 
18 soon as, you know, Judge Atherton said "You're ordered to pay 
19 $126,000" then an objection and a request for a restitution 
20 hearing should have been filed. 
21 It seems like that counsel for defense attempted to 
22 make the Judge aware that there would be disputes and attempted 
23 to set a restitution hearing and the Judge specifically said, 
24 "I'm not going to set one yet until you get closer on an 
25 amount." And it's on the State to initiate that process. 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. So as I have stated -- and you 
2 keep referring to the commitment or the judgment, sentence and 





know if this was a clerical error or not, but there is a 
judgment, sentence, and commitment that is entered February 27, 
2000 -- well, it it's shows that date on the docket. 
He was still on probation at the time. And it -- the 
8 J and C says October 15, 2010. And it does state restitution 
9 in the amount of $126,547. That's says -- that's what it says 




MS. BARKER: Is that on the docket? 
THE COURT: Yes. You want me to print it for you? 
MS. BARKER: No, I've seen that on the docket and 
14 I -- I questioned that when I saw it so I pulled up the actual 
15 sentence, judgment, and commitment. It was dated October 15th. 
16 And it does not include restitution. 
17 THE COURT: So there are two. That's my point is: 
18 There is one that was entered October 19, 2010. That was 
19 probably around the time he was sentenced. But there is a 
20 subsequent one that is entered February 27, 2012. And I think 
21 that's what Mr. Blaylock refers to as maybe a clerical error. 
22 Because as you've outlined, the -- the transcript of 
23 the sentencing that took place on October 15, 2010, does state 
24 that Judge Atherton ordered the restitution in that amount. 
25 The J and C that was signed and filed on October 19th, doesn't 
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·1 include restitution -- the restitution order. 
2 And it appears that subsequently, when AP&P filed the 
3 progress violation, after that -- they filed a progress 
4 violation report to terminate probation in July of 2011, a new 
5 judgment, sentence, and commitment was signed by Judge Atherton 
6 that then included the restitution that was ordered. 
7 So I'm finding based on the transcript that 
8 Judge Atherton did order restitution as part of the sentence in 
9 this case in the amount of $126,547 that that restitution 
10 amount did not make it on the original judgment, sentence, and 
11 commitment and I don't know why. 
12 Subsequent to that, Judge Atherton did sign and file 
13 a judgment, sentence, and commitment. I'm referring to the one 
14 that appears to have been entered February 27, 2012 that shows 
15 the judgment or excuse me, the restitution that was ordered 
16 on the day of sentencing accurately. 
17 Secondly, when AP&P asked to terminate probation in 
18 this case and file the progress violation report, prior to my 
19 terminating probation as requested, there was an indication in 
20 there about the restitution being sent to debt collection. 
21 There was never an objection by anyone, including the 
22 defendant, pursuant to the minute entry that was sent out by 
23 the court on October 1, 2013. 
24 And also, that the transcript -- regardless, I mean, 
25 once the judge orders restitution and orders that it be paid in 
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1 a particular amount, the judgment, sentence, and commitment --
2 or excuse me, the transcript says, when defendant counsel asked 
3 for a restitution hearing, there is a colloquy with 
4 Judge Atherton that Judge Atherton says, something like: "I 
5 will let you approach later, but I want to get this on rather 
6 than deferring it. I want you to make monthly payments." 
7 Then the discussion later is defense counsel saying, 
8 "We've talked about having a restitution hearing to determine 
9 what court-ordered restitution and total restitution should 
10 be." 
11 The Judge says, "Well, get closer. There are 
12 disputes. So what I want you to do is file a motion for 
13 restitution and with some specifics about what I can look at 
14 before we get into a restitution hearing and nobody knows 
15 anything. " 
16 So I'm not saying that the onus shouldn't be on the 
17 State. I, frankly, look at that and I think: Well, the onus 
18 is on the defense because the response by Judge Atherton was in 
19 response to Mr. Van De Camp saying, "We talked about having a 
20 restitution hearing." And Judge Atherton says, "Well, get 
21 closer and then file a motion." 
22 And then nobody bothers to do anything, but in the 
23 meantime restitution is going on, probation is terminated based 
24 on, my assumption, that the restitution will be sent to Utah 
25 State Debt Collection and nobody objects to that and so forth. 
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1 And lastly, this restitution amount would be a civil 
2 judgment. Total restitution not necessarily court-ordered 
3 because it's unclear to me what Judge Atherton decided in that 
4 regard. But I'm going to deny the motion for relief from 
5 judgment and the restitution amount will remain as it is and 
6 will remain with Utah State Debt Collection. 
7 MS. BARKER: And, Your Honor, the second part of the 
8 motion was a request for a restitution hearing. And if I 
9 understand the Court's position on denying the motion for 
10 relief from judgment, but in the alternative, I had argued that 
11 Mr. Speed was entitled to a restitution hearing, that the -- a 
12 request -- I don't know what type of request for restitution, 
13 if any, was ever made following Judge Atherton's colloquy with 
14 the parties. 
15 It appears that a motion of some type was 
16 anticipated, which is typically precipitated by a request from 
17 the State for a specific amount of restitution, that is then 
18 related to the defense. And I don't see any motion to that 
19 effect. So based on the fact that there was never a hearing on 
20 this issue and there was no notice given to Mr. Speed prior to 
21 the restitution amount being --




MS. BARKER: There --
THE COURT: I think that's where the amount comes 
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1 MS. BARKER: That is where the amount comes from, but 
2 I think that as far as Mr. Speed would have been aware, at the 
3 time of his sentencing, there was going to be some ongoing 
4 proceedings to determine restitution that were never held. And 
5 because they weren't, the restitution amount was ultimately 
6 entered in the full amount stated in the presentence report. 
7 But I would ask that Ms. Speed be allowed to have a 




You want to respond, Mr. Blaylock? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: I think that's been waived. He's had 
12 two or three opportunities. He had the opportunity through 
~ 13 counsel when the amount was originally stated to request a 
14 restitution hearing. And when this matter come up for 
15 termination of the probation, again he had an opportunity at 
16 that time if he contested the amount of restitution to have a 
17 restitution hearing. That wasn't done in due time and I would 
18 suggest that's waived. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anything further? 19 
20 MS. BARKER: Your Honor, I don't think that Mr. Speed 
21 has waived that because there was no request for restitution 
22 ever filed by the State. I don't know exactly what he was told 
23 by AP&P as far as the full amount of the restitution being 
vj 24 entered. He did start paying on that and that when it was 
25 when the matter was closed, I don't know what advice or counsel 
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1 he was given on that to know whether he had knowledge of the 
2 legal ramifications of how this would effect him. 
3 So I think that without actual notice to an attorney 
4 of a restitution amount being sought in a hearing or without 
5 some legal notice to Mr. Speed notifying him that he had an 
6 opportunity to challenge amounts that were entered by the court 
7 pursuant to the presentence report, that he has not waived. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. So I'm looking at the last 
9 progress violation report that I received that precipitated the 
10 termination of probation. In that report it states on one of 
11 of the pages the money that is owed. There is -- in 
12 particular, in regards to restitution. The original amount was 
13 $126,547. The interest was $8,908.56. The payments that were 
14 made by the defendant was $1,418. This is only as to 
15 restitution. There were other payments made. 
16 Remaining amount was $134.37 and 56 -- or $37.56. So 
17 with that, I again, sent out a minute entry asking any party to 
18 object to the recommendation from AP&P. No objection was filed 
19 and subsequently the matter was closed, and the request by AP&P 
20 was granted. Before that, as I stated, there was a restitution 
21 amount stated in the presentence report. 
22 There was a restitution amount ordered by 
23 Judge Atherton. And again, until well after the case was 
24 closed, other than the colloquy at the sentencing, nothing was 
25 made of the restitution. And so the Court finds that the 
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i; 
1 defendant has waived any issue regarding restitution. I don't 
2 know that I even have jurisdiction to reconsider that because 
3 it might open up a whole lot of other things, including --
4 I mean, if I terminated probation based on those 
5 representations, does that mean if I change the restitution or 
6 do something of that case, I can re-instate his probation and 
7 order that he pay restitution or· 
8 I mean, a lot of those things that have come and 
9 gone, I think, have effected the way that the case has gone. 
10 And so based on that, I'm denying the request for a restitution 
11 hearing in this matter. 














MS. BARKER: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
(End of hearing.) 
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